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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the oil crises of the 1970s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange  rates,  macroeconomic  policy  coordination  was  invoked  almost  exclusively 
among  the  increasingly  interdependent  economies  of  the  OECD.  Leaders  of  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  first  met  at 
Rambouillet, being joined by Canada in 1976 to form the G-7. Finance ministers and 
central bank governors of the G7 informally coordinated OECD and IMF multilateral 
surveillance activities. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, finance officials 
from about 20 major advanced and emerging countries “discussed measures to promote 
the financial stability of the world and to achieve a sustainable economic growth and 
development”. When Russia’s leader joined the G7, it became the G8 and summit chairs 
began to invite major emerging countries. Moreover Canada called for leaders of the 20 
countries to meet on cross cutting issues as needed
2. As it turns out, the first G-20 summit 
was held in Washington in December 2008 to deal with the financial crisis even though it 
also sought to preserve the multilateral trade system. There were follow up meetings on 
macroeconomic  stimulus  packages  in  London  and  Pittsburgh,  where  the  so  called 
Washington  consensus  of  the  1990s  was  “pronounced  dead”  and  the  IMF  received  a 
renewed mandate for comparative analysis.  
 
                                                 
1 An earlier version was presented at Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa, on 13 October 2009 at a Philosophy Department conference organized by  my  ACL colleague 
Michel Renaud and by Gonçalo Marcelo. Since I first used the title of the Crowded House song recorded in 
New Zealand in 1992 in remarks at a dinner on 25 September 2008 for London Business School alumni in 
Lisbon, I have received many comments on this material. I acknowledge especially an entrepreneurial 
motivation  course  in  mid-August  at  a  neighbor's  home  in  Almoçageme,  Sintra  (available  at 
www.jbmacedo.com/ferragosto);  a  course  on  Development  and  state  reform  at  Instituto  de  Estudos 
Superiores Militares, Pedrouços, 17 September; the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 
meeting,  “Towards  a  global  new  deal”,  Waterloo,  Ontario,  on  2  October,  the  Launch  Conference  for 
Initiative  for  Development  and  Global  Governance  (IDGM),  Paris, 6  November;  Les  Rencontres  Jean 
Monnet des Fondations Européennes, Cognac 14 November; Waterland Ten Years After, Institut Franco-
Portugais,  Lisbon,  17  November;  Clube  Tauromáquico,  Lisbon,  18  November;  the  IV  Annual 
Specialization  Course  for  Young  Ibero-American  Diplomats,  Secretariado  Geral  Ibero  Americano 
(SEGIB), Lisbon, 3 December; special session on Europe, ACL, February 11. See note 36 below. 
2 In addition to the website of the Korean presidency in 2010 (www.g20.org), the University of Toronto 
maintains a website about the G8 and CIGI was at the forefront of the G20 at leaders’ level. The OECD 
Development Center attempted to follow G20 finance work, see Macedo et al. (2001) and OECD (2003). 2 
After decades when failures of coordination within and between advanced countries, even 
within an increasingly integrated EU, were seen with benign neglect, governments had to 
face together a financial crisis that their nations addressed alone. Actually this paradox in 
the interaction between globalization and governance (G&G) arose within the euro area 
itself.  There  policy  coordination  is  supposed  to  be  strongest,  even  before  the  Lisbon 
treaty gave a formal role to the finance ministers of its member countries, alongside those 
of the EU – who were signatories of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Independently of joint 
appearances at the G-20 summits, following enlarged G-8 events, developed countries 
and emerging markets realize that they are mutually interdependent even though they 
rarely coordinate their national policy responses, making the “together alone” as global as 
the crisis.  
 
The trade and financial links between the United States and China, sometimes called the 
G-2, are the most vivid example but the differences in the perception of the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008 by the Queen of England and the President of Brazil are equally 
striking. On a visit to the London School of Economics on 5 November, 2008, Queen 
Elizabeth asked Luis Garicano: “if these things were so large, how come everyone missed 
them?” During a subsequent visit to Brazil of her Prime Minister, President Lula made an 
equally  celebrated  comment:  the  crisis  originating  in  rich  countries  is  “a  blue-eyed 
crisis”. There have been responses to the question in the form of letters, whereas the 
comment has been neglected as a kind of ethnic joke. Nevertheless, the implicit exchange 
between Queen and President underscores the cultural dimension of the “together alone” 
paradox:  no  one  saw  the  global  crisis  coming  because  everyone  who  could  see 
suppressed a (blue-eyed) crisis. This tendency for “group think” cannot be ignored “in a 
world  that  is  both  highly  connected  and  tribal”
3.  In  any  event,  the  British  Academy 
responded to the Queen’s question on 17 June, 2009 by convening a “Forum” on the 
crisis chaired by Peter Hennessy where Charles Goodhart opened the discussion and the 
Forum chair and Tim Besley signed the letter on 22 July
4.  
 
A second “Forum” on the subject was held on 15 December 2009, and another letter sent 
on  8  February,  2010,  investigating  “financial  and  economic  horizon-scanning 
capabilities”.  The  second  letter  was  more  critical  of  the  UK  government  precisely 
because “the major challenge is to make institutions and organizational cultures work 
together. This means also getting the right people involved who see the task as a central 
part of their role in government. One can have as much scenario planning as one likes, 
                                                 
3 Gillian Tett, Financial Times, 9 October, 2009 - who refers to this as the “silo curse”.  
4 The first Forum met on 19 March to discuss The Strange Career of British Democracy. Hennessy is 
Queen  Mary  University  of  London  professor  of  contemporary  British  history  and  former  journalist; 
Goodhart is Emeritus LSE professor of banking and finance and former chief economic advisor to the Bank 
of England; Besley is Professor of economic development at LSE, director of The Suntory and Toyota 
International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines and former member of the monetary policy 
committee  of  the  Bank  of  England.  David  Turner,  FT  education  correspondent,  wrote  “Credit  crunch 
failure  explained  to  Queen”  (FT.com,  26  July).  The  website  of  the  British  Academy  quoted  its  chief 
executive and secretary: “The global recession is a huge development, and it is reasonable to ask to what 
extent it could have been foreseen. What’s more, we can’t say ‘never again’ if we don’t fully understand 
what occurred”. The Queen’s Private Secretary wrote back on 30 July, indicating her interest in the project. 3 
but if there is no buy in from the people who will be taking the decisions in a crisis, then 
it is probably counterproductive”
 5.  
 
This paper contends that the G&G paradox revealed by the global crisis is rooted in 
“group think” within and between countries. In spite of peer review mechanisms at the 
OECD  and  the  EU,  and  of  international  governance  innovation  such  as  the  “global 
partnership  for  development”  (and  the  seven  other  Millennium  Development  Goals 
MDGs), not enough attention was paid to common problems among advanced countries, 
including financial regulation and supervision in the face of rising asset prices. Increased 
trade in goods, services and assets led to rising global imbalances between the US and 
emerging markets with currencies pegged to the dollar, especially China. The resulting 
volatility in prices of oil and staples had severe implications for poverty alleviation and 
food security, making the seven quantified MDGs impossible to reach in 2015, especially 
in  the  African  Union  (AU),  where  a  peer  review  mechanism  has  been  operating  for 
almost  ten  years.  The  argument  in  section  2  embeds  the  letters  to  the  Queen  into  a 
renewed interest in methodology which goes beyond recurrent calls for interdisciplinary 
research - as long as this research does not disturb the usual “economists tribes”, a point 
that comes across more clearly in the second letter. Noting failures of cooperation within 
and between countries, section 3 applies a perspective based on G&G interaction to the 
“together  alone”  paradox.  It  introduces  mutual  knowledge  as  essential  for  the  global 
partnership on development and presents in that connection the experience of culture-
based  multilateralism  among  members  of  the  Community  of  Portuguese-speaking 
Countries (CPLP).  
 
Drawing on a comparison of multilateral surveillance frameworks, section 4 focuses on 
Europe as an example of regional governance where peer pressure stems from explicit 
commitments
6. While peer reviews need not promote the common good, which requires a 
combination of greater integration and flexibility, applications of multilateral surveillance 
beyond  OECD  members  and  the  emerging  G20  may  turn  out  to  be  international 
governance  innovations.  The  concluding  section  5  notes  the  IMF  mandate  from 
                                                 
5 The second letter ended with a proposal that caught the attention of the media: “If you, Your Majesty, 
were to ask for a monthly economic and financial horizon-scanning summary from, say, the Cabinet Office, 
it could hardly be refused. It might take a form comparable to the Joint Intelligence Committee’s ‘Red 
Book’, which you received each week from 1952 until 2008 when it was abandoned. And, if this were to 
happen, the spirit of your LSE question would suffuse still more those of your Crown servants tasked to 
defend,  preserve  and  enhance  the  economic  well-being  of  your  country”.  This  has  not  yet  brought  a 
response but was followed by a debate on exit strategies from the fiscal stimulus, in letters to the Sunday 
Times of February 14 by Besley and others suggesting an early exit followed by letters to the Financial 
Times of February 19 arguing against it. The UK electoral campaign thus begins with “a fiscal battle” 
among economists, very much along the lines of the “together alone” paradox described in the text. 
6 Thygesen (2002) compares IMF, OECD and EU. Macedo (2003) adds the New Partnership for African 
Development  (NEPAD),  established  with  the  formal  adoption  of  the  Strategic  Framework  at  the  37th 
Summit of the Organization for African Unity in July 2001 now being integrated in the AU structures and 
processes  and  called  NEPAD  Planning  and  Coordinating  Agency.  The  integrated  socio-economic 
development framework proposed by the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa 
established a secretariat in Pretoria. Macedo (2003) also includes case studies in mutual knowledge: social 
dialogue  in  Mozambique  (Mantero  and  Santos  2002)  and  post-conflict  transition  in  the  Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Castillo, 2003);  see NEPAD (2001), UNECA (2002) and (Kanbur, 2004). 4 
“Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth” approved at the Pittsburgh. 
It remains to be seen whether multilateral surveillance mechanisms reflect the mutual 
accountability  contained  in  the  Monterey  declaration  of  February  2002  which  was 
supposed to replace the so called Washington consensus. If so, the G20 might bring out 
coalitions where peer pressure is for action, not for inaction, so that G&G interaction 
becomes positive on a broader front.             
 
2. DECONSTRUCTING THE LETTERS TO THE QUEEN 
 
2.1. “Economic culture wars” revisited 
If the G20 enhances the multilateral surveillance framework of the IMF in the direction 
of  mutual  accountability,  coalitions  among  nations  and  regions  will  have  beneficial 
consequences  for  the  global  common  good  and  may  reflect  positively  on  the  role  of 
economists in public life. At the moment, the field is full of controversy: on October 12, 
the day the Nobel prize in economics was announced, a “global insight” by Alan Beattie 
appeared in the Financial Times about the bickering between freshwater (e.g. Chicago) 
and saltwater (e.g. MIT) economists
7. Yet this has not avoided “tribal” answers from salt 
or freshwater economists. Worse yet, both tribes share what Lo (2009) calls “physics 
envy” over organic analogies which would seem to be more appropriate to model the 




Perhaps the way to go about it is to recognize at least another tribe. I call it the tribe of 
turgid economists, broadening the label “turgid” Carlos Diaz Alejandro used to describe 
the  economics  of  Unequal  Exchange  in  his  Yale  graduate  course  thirty  years  ago 
(Emmanuel 1969)
9. In fact, the only methodological debate I remember, in part because I 
                                                 
7 The profession needs humility he said, and added “anyone who thinks otherwise is an idiot.” The 2009 
awards testify that economics as a social science deals with institutional and governance issues Mocking 
rational  expectations  in  a  cartoon  inspired  by  Voltaire’s  Candide  appeared  in  the  FT  of  30  and  31 
December: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5a1261c-f493-11de-9cba-00144feab49a.html.  
8 The British Academy Forum planned on this point took place at end 2009 and led to the second letter to 
the Queen mentioned in the text. There was another letter to the Queen written by “ten leading British 
Economists (…), claiming that the training of economists is too narrow: “Mathematical technique should 
not  dominate  real-world  substance.”  (Hodgson  2009a).  The  letter  came  to  my  attention  through  João 
Rodrigues, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Manchester. I subsequently learned that a web petition 
titled “Revitalizing Economics After the Crash” was organized by Hodgson (2009b) in support of Krugman 
(2009): "I think this is an important opportunity to make an impact, and I'd like to encourage you to add 
your signature. It’s not an attempt to lionize Krugman (although he deserves full credit), but to use his 
forceful words to help reform economics. It's free and takes less than a minute of your time". The points in 
the letter to the Queen apply to the UK and maybe the US, but they do not reflect other perspectives: “The 
candor with which we dissect the lessons of the events of the past year and apply them in future will 
determine whether this salutary shock will turn out to have been a beneficial one”. Clive Cookson, Gillian 
Tett and Chris Cook report on “organic mechanics” work, including Lo (2009), Haldane (2009) and others 
in the FT of 27 November. See note 20 and below in the text.  
9 Jedlicki (2007) has a summary. I applied this label when introducing in late 2009 the Portuguese edition 
of The Black Holes in Economic Science by Jacques Sapir (who, like Emmanuel, was a student of Charles 
Bettelheim’s),  ten  years  after  the  French  original.  The  timing  was  good  because  of  the  revival  of 
methodological quarrels in economics. These were disappearing around the time Harry Johnson visited 
Yale from Chicago and LSE. References abound for the ongoing debate: Financial Times editorial 27 July 5 
used it in my introductory macro course at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, happened in 
Slate Magazine in the Fall of 1996 launched by Paul Krugman’s “Economic Culture 
Wars” following a critical review of his celebrated (1995)
10. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
Two pictures illustrate respectively the origin of the crisis in the US economy and its 
effects on domestic output. Figure 1 (from Gjerstadt and Smith, 2009) could certainly 
motivate the Queen’s question. In 2001, after four years of inflation-adjusted house price 
increases of 7,2%, the Federal funds rate began a descent to its lowest recorded level - 
reached in 2004. Krugman’s blog (The New York Times 18 September) calculates the 
costs of the crisis for the US: compared with 2007 4th quarter, 2009 2nd quarter GDP 
was at 96 whereas it would be at 104 on previous trend. The 8 point fall, apparent in 
Figure 2 (from Menzie Chinn’s econbrowser blog), is accompanied by an equally unusual 
6 point decline in consumption and an unemployment rate close to 10%. The graphs 
illustrate how large the issue is: the parallel with the 1920s - when residential mortgage 
rose from 10% of household net wealth to 29% - is striking. The recession which began 
end 2007 is about half of the Great Depression in the US - but worldwide it is the same as 
demonstrated by Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) in the most quoted Vox EU post
11. 
 
The quote from Krugman in Hodgson (2009b) follows: "Few economists saw our current 
crisis  coming,  but  this  predictive  failure  was  the  least  of  the  field’s  problems.  More 
important was the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in 
a market economy ... the economics profession went astray because economists, as a 
group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth ... economists 
fell  back  in  love  with  the  old,  idealized  vision  of  an  economy  in  which  rational 
individuals  interact  in  perfect  markets,  this  time  gussied  up  with  fancy  equations  ... 
Unfortunately,  this  romanticized  and  sanitized  vision  of  the  economy  led  most 
economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the 
limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of 
institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets – especially financial markets 
                                                                                                                                                 
(excerpted below in text), ft.com/arena “what is the point of economists” (Robert Skidelsky, calling for the 
reconstruction of economics as a moral not a natural science on 6 August; Samuel Brittan, comparing 
economists  to  the  “Titanic  designers”  on  7  August);  The  Economist,  16  July  (“macro  and  financial 
economists helped cause the crisis, failed to spot it and have no idea on how to fix it”, contra Robert Lucas, 
“In defense of the dismal science”, 6 August); NYT Magazine 2 September (Paul Krugman, “Why did 
economists get it so wrong?”). 
10 Kuttner (1996), Krugman (1996), Galbraith (1996). Galbraith has also responded to Krugman’s NYT 
Magazine piece. Both were at Yale when I was there in the late 1970s. Their latest debate follows below in 
the text. 
11 Available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421 with data comparing two world depressions 
with respect to Industrial Production, Stock Markets and Foreign Trade as well as the moentary and fiscal 
policy  responses.  Quoting  http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/the-great-recession-versus-the-
great-depression/:  “Reading about the  global  manufacturing plunge, I  wondered: how  does the current 
slump  stack  up  against  the  early  stages  of  the  Great  Depression?  The  US  has  consistent  industrial 
production data back to 1919, so it’s a fairly straightforward exercise. At first, the current recession didn’t 
hit industrial production all that hard. But the pace accelerated dramatically last fall, so that at this point 
we’re sort of experiencing half a Great Depression. That’s pretty bad”.  6 
–  that  can  cause  the  economy’s  operating  system  to  undergo  sudden,  unpredictable 
crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation. ... When 
it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and depressions, economists need to 
abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets 
work perfectly."  
 
Galbraith  (2010)  begins  with  another  quote  from  Krugman  (2009):  “Of  course,  there 
were exceptions to these trends: a few economists challenged the assumption of rational 
behavior, questioned the belief that financial markets can be trusted and pointed to the 
long history of financial crises that had devastating economic consequences. But they 
were swimming against the tide, unable to make much headway against a pervasive and, 
in  retrospect,  foolish  complacency”  and  takes  issue  with  him  for  not  naming  the 
exceptions:  “Apart  from  one  other  half-sentence,  and  three  passing  mentions  of  one 
person,  it’s  the  only  discussion—the  one  mention  in  the  entire  essay—  of  those 
economists who got it right. They are not named. Their work is not cited. Their story 
remains  untold.  Despite  having  been  right  on  the  greatest  economic  question  of  a 
generation—they  are  unpersons  in  the  tale”.  He  goes  on  to  compare  the  distinction 
between  saltwater  and  freshwater  economists  to  Tweedledum  and  Tweedledee  and 
concludes: “This  remains the essential problem. As  I have documented—and only  in 
part— there is a considerable, rich, promising body of economics, theory and evidence, 
entirely suited to the study of the real economy and its enormous problems. This work is 
significant  in  ways  in  which  the  entire  corpus  of  mainstream  economics—including 
recent fashions like the new “behavioral economics”— simply is not. But where is it 
inside  the  economics  profession?  Essentially,  nowhere.  It  is  therefore  pointless  to 
continue with conversations centered on the conventional economics. The urgent need is 
instead to expand the academic space and the public visibility of ongoing work that is of 
actual value when faced with the many deep problems of economic life in our time. It is 
to make possible careers in those areas, and for people with those perspectives, that have 
been proven worthy by events. This is—obviously—not a matter to be entrusted to the 
economics  departments  themselves.  It  is  an  imperative,  instead,  for  university 
administrators, for funding agencies, for foundations, and for students and perhaps their 
parents. The point is not to argue endlessly with Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The point 
is to move past them toward the garden that must be out there, that in fact is out there, 
somewhere” (emphasis in original). 
 
While revisiting these economic culture wars more than ten years after helps deconstruct 
the  letters  to  the  Queen,  the  development  dimension  remains  as  implicit  as  the 
hypothetical  exchange  with  President  Lula  mentioned  at  the  outset.  The  “silo  curse” 
brings out historical comparisons but also a broader geographical domain, beyond the 
“blue-eyed” or Western world. In other words, the dangers of “group think”, apparent 
before this crisis, have not been analyzed in connection with global, or even regional, 
governance
12.  Section  2  looks  at  how  the  G&G  interaction  changes  along  the 
                                                 
12 In December 2006 (Franco, 2008, p. 235), Krugman spoke in Lisbon of “incestuous suppression” in 
connection  with  resistance  to  social  security  reform  in  the  US.  On  healthcare  he  added:  “The  US  is 
probably spending about three times as much per capita now as Portugal, with worse results in infant 
mortality and not much difference in life expectancy. The range of things that can be talked about in a 7 
development  path  and  refers  to  organizational  economics  perspectives  by  Besley  and 
Persson (2009) with respect to the origins of state capacity and by Garicano and Posner 
(2005) with respect from intelligence failures in the United States following the 9/11 
attacks
13.  Guarding against simple solutions with respect to intelligence, they argue that 
decentralization reduces herding and sharing and that less centralized organizations adapt 
less well to a changing environment. On the positive side, they note that all organizations 
enable  the  constraints  of  bounded  rationality  to  be  circumvented,  so  that  more 
information (e.g., intelligence data) can be gathered and a greater variety of expertise can 
be  used  in  its  compilation  and  evaluation  than  any  individual  or  small  group  could 
achieve.  
 
The conclusions of Garicano and Posner (2005) illustrate the nature of the approach. An 
organizational  hierarchy  enables  the  aggregation  of  information:  a  bit  of  information 
from the field is, if routine, dealt with by a field officer; if the bit is unusual, it goes up 
the organizational ladder to a more knowledgeable officer who decides what action to 
take; information that is truly exceptional continues up to the top of the hierarchy. This 
“management by exception” allows for the optimal matching of problems with expertise. 
Organizational  problems  arise  in  the  three  main  steps  in  the  process  of  generating 
intelligence:  in  reverse  order  they  are  intelligence  analysis,  intelligence  sharing,  and 
intelligence collection. A serious organizational failure at the analysis stage is “herding,” 
or, as observers often put it, ”group think,” in which the accumulated information and 
conclusions  develop  such  a  strong  momentum  that  they  cannot  be  successfully 
challenged.  Intelligence  analysis  succumbed  to  “herding”  in  the  virtually  unanimous 
conclusion of the intelligence community that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. An 
erroneous consensus of this kind may be due to organizational malfunctions, such as a 
poorly designed information and communication structure or a bad set of incentives for 
agents.  It  also  may  be  the  unavoidable  result  of  efficient  but  second-best  design 
decisions.  When  a  pattern  is  missed  because  different  pieces  of  information  are  not 
shared, erroneous conclusions can result
14. ”Group think” may also be the result of an 
efficient organizational-design decision: the organization may be rationally designed to 
filter out most information on the way to the top of the organizational hierarchy in order 
                                                                                                                                                 
proper debate turns out to be limited, because there are people who are persistent participants in that debate, 
and exercise censure on themselves.” 
13 As mentioned above in the text, the Queen’s question was addressed  to Garicano while Besley wrote the 
letters of the British Academy. Garicano and Posner (2005) take an organizational economics perspective 
on high level investigative commissions and the belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass 
destruction. 
14 The authors add that this was a major factor in the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks. An organization 
can be poorly designed to achieve a desired goal. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is supposed to both 
solve crimes and conduct domestic national-security intelligence, but it is designed for the former task, and 
because the organizational structures required for the two tasks are different, it does not perform the latter 
task well. Two caveats are in order. First, while organizational problems may have contributed to the recent 
intelligence failures, nonorganizational problems, such as incompetence of individuals, political pressures, 
and sheer bad luck (intelligence has a built-in failure rate because it is an endeavor to uncover secret 
information), may have been larger contributory factors. Second, organizational reform is likely to have 
only limited efficacy even addressed to genuine organizational problems because of unavoidable tradeoffs. 
Nevertheless, they see the combination of criminal investigation and national-security intelligence as a 
clear example of combining incompatible missions in the same organization. 8 
to economize on the time and attention of senior management. In an organization that 
contains  multiple  layers  of  hierarchy  in  which  experienced  supervisors  review 
information, ideas, and judgments coming to them from lower levels in the organization: 
fewer mistakes are committed that result from accepting bad ideas or judgments, but at 
the cost of mistakenly failing to act on sound ideas. Looser, less centralized organizations 
filter out fewer ideas and thus produce a more diverse set of options for the leaders of the 
organization to choose among. Which type of mistake is more harmful depends primarily 
on the organization’s environment (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). When the environment is 
unstable, the organization should be decentralized in order to maximize the likelihood 
that  many  fresh  new  ideas  will  be  produced,  for  that  will  make  it  easier  for  the 
organization to adapt to a changing environment
15.  
 
2.2. Nine points and then three more 
The  nine  points  in  the  July  2009  letter  follow,  then  the  editorial  and  additional 
commentary before the additional points in the February 2010 letter. 
 
1. Ferocity not foreseen, powers not available 
Many people did foresee the crisis. However, the exact form that it would take and the 
timing  of  its  onset  and  ferocity  were  foreseen  by  nobody.  What  matters  in  such 
circumstances is not just to predict the nature of the problem but also its timing. And 
there is also finding the will to act and being sure that authorities have as part of their 
powers the right instruments to bring to bear on the problem. 
 
2. Imbalances and risk neglected 
There  were  many  warnings  about  imbalances  in  financial  markets  and  in  the  global 
economy. For example, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) expressed repeated 
concerns  that  risks  did  not  seem  to  be  properly  reflected  in  financial  markets.  Risk 
management was considered an important part of financial markets. But the difficulty 
was  seeing  the  risk  to  the  system  as  a  whole  rather  than  to  any  specific  financial 
instrument  or  loan.  Risk  calculations  were  most  often  confined  to  slices  of  financial 
activity, using some of the best mathematical minds. But they frequently lost sight of the 
bigger picture. Many were also concerned about imbalances in the global economy.   
 
3. Global savings glut and easy borrowing 
A period of unprecedented global expansion had seen many people in poor countries, 
particularly China and India, improving their living standards. But this prosperity had led 
to what is now known as the ‘global savings glut’. This led to very low returns on safer 
long-term investments which, in turn, led many investors to seek higher returns at the 
expense of greater risk. The rise of China lowered the cost of many goods that we buy. 
                                                 
15  Garicano  and  Posner  (2005)  add  two  corporate  examples:  3M  provides  its  employees  with  ample 
discretion. It has a culture of forgiving failure and allowing individuals to buck senior management in 
pursuit of what may look like unrealizable ideas. When the environment changes slowly, so that adaptation 
is achievable by incremental adjustments, the organization should be designed with many filters so that the 
errors that are made are of the type “a few good ideas were not tried out” rather than “we went ahead with 
some terrible ideas and damaged our franchise.” At Procter and Gamble, new product proposals go through 
40 to 50 revisions until they reach the CEO for a decision. 9 
Through ready access to capital in the financial system, it was easy for households and 
businesses to borrow. This in turn fuelled the increase in house prices.  
 
4. Wishful thinking combined with hubris about risk 
There were many who warned of the dangers of this. But against those who warned, most 
were convinced that banks knew what they were doing. They believed that the financial 
wizards had found new and clever ways of managing risks. Indeed, some claimed to have 
so dispersed them through an array of novel financial instruments that they had virtually 
removed them. It is difficult to recall a greater example of wishful thinking combined 
with hubris.  
 
5. Politicians believed bankers were engineers  
There was a firm belief, too, that financial markets had changed. And politicians of all 
types were charmed by the market. These views were abetted by financial and economic 
models  that  were  good  at  predicting  the  short-term  and  small  risks,  but  few  were 
equipped to say what would happen when things went wrong as they have. People trusted 
the banks whose boards and senior executives were packed with globally recruited talent 
and their non-executive directors included those with proven track records in public life. 
Nobody wanted to believe that their judgment could be faulty or that they were unable 
competently to scrutinize the risks in the organizations that they managed. A generation 
of bankers and financiers deceived themselves and those who thought that they were the 
pace-making engineers of advanced economies. 
 
6. Feel good factor led to delusion 
All this exposed the difficulties of slowing the progression of such developments in the 
presence of a general ‘feel-good’ factor. Households benefited from low unemployment, 
cheap  consumer  goods  and  ready  credit.  Businesses  benefited  from  lower  borrowing 
costs. Bankers were earning bumper bonuses and expanding their business around the 
world.  The  government  benefited  from  high  tax  revenues  enabling  them  to  increase 
public spending on schools and hospitals. This was bound to  create  a psychology  of 
denial. It was a cycle fuelled, in significant measure, not by virtue but by delusion. 
 
7. Lax regulation: don’t do bubbles after dot.com 
Among the authorities charged with managing these risks, there were difficulties too. 
Some say that their job should have been ‘to take away the punch bowl when the party 
was in full swing’. But that assumes that they had the instruments needed to do this. 
General  pressure  was  for  more  lax  regulation  –  a  light  touch.  There  was  a  broad 
consensus that it was better to deal with the aftermath of bubbles in stock markets and 
housing markets than to try to head them off in advance.  
 
The  experience  after  the  turn  of  the  millennium  when  a  recession  was  more  or  less 
avoided after the ‘dot com’ bubble burst fuelled the view that we could bail out the 
economy  after  the  event.  Inflation  remained  low  and  created  no  warning  sign  of  an 
economy that was overheating. But this meant that interest rates were low by historical 
standards.  And  some  said  that  policy  was  therefore  not  sufficiently  geared  towards 
heading off the risks. Some countries did raise interest rates to ‘lean against the wind’. 10 
But on the whole, the prevailing view was that monetary policy was best used to prevent 
inflation and not to control wider imbalances in the economy. 
 
8. Psychology of herding and no single authority  
So where was the problem? Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its 
own merit. And according to standard measures of success, they were often doing it well.  
The  failure  was  to  see  how  collectively  this  added  up  to  a  series  of  interconnected 
imbalances  over  which  no  single  authority  had  jurisdiction.  This,  combined  with  the 
psychology of herding and the mantra of financial and policy gurus, lead to a dangerous 
recipe.  
 
9. Forecasting failure: never again? 
Individual risks may rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a 
whole was vast. The failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to 
head it off was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people to 
understand the risks to the system as a whole. Given the forecasting failure at the heart of 
the  question,  government  agencies  might  develop  a  new,  shared  horizon-scanning 
capability so that it never needs to be asked again.  
 
The FT editorial “At your own risk” goes along the same lines as the letter. Excerpts 
follow (emphasis supplied): No economic theory can perform the feats its users have 
come to expect of it. Economics is unlikely ever to be very good at predicting the future. 
Too much of what happens in an economy depends on what people expect to happen. 
Even state-of-the-art forecasts are therefore better guides to the present mood than the 
future - though they may also be self-fulfilling prophecies. Dabbling in paradox limits 
the  use  of  economics  as  a  practical  guide.  Today  the  profession’s  best  advice  must 
convince  politicians  and  the  public  to  combat  a  crisis  born  of  insufficient  thrift  by 
recourse to record borrowing. Those who saw danger had no easier task: even reminding 
people of gravity’s existence is a hard sell when everything is going up. If predictions 
of physics-like precision are in demand, they will be supplied. Collective delusion must 
therefore be blamed as much on the consumers of economics – companies, investors, the 
media – as its producers. But its irresponsible use does not mean economics is useless. 
It is rather good at explaining the past and guessing unintended consequences of well-
meaning policies – invaluable tools for cleaning up financial markets. So we do need 
economists in public debate, but ones not blinded by mathematical sophistication or 
paradoxes  beyond  the  lay  public’s  grasp.  The  public  intellectual’s  virtues  –  curiosity 
about other fields, aversion to dogma – could do the discipline much good. Unfortunately 
these are no longer much valued in the academic hierarchy.  
 
The first letter to the Queen focuses on the advanced economies (especially US and UK) 
and only mentions China and India in connection with the “global savings glut” in point 
3. Point 5 (seeing bankers as engineers) pertains more broadly to “advanced economies” 
and leads to the ‘feel-good factor’ there as creating a “psychology of denial” (point 6). 
The “pressure for more lax regulation” (point 7) was also greatest in US and UK since 
“some countries did raise interest rates” (point 7a) but the “psychology of herding” (point 
8) fed the benign neglect about rising imbalances in the US balance of payments. The 11 
view of the US and China as a pseudo monetary union reinforced the complacency about 
systemic risks (point 9).  
 
While the interaction between G&G became unsustainable in UK and US in early 2007, 
the  spread  of  the  crisis  to  the  eurozone  and  the  Rest  of  the  World  (ROW)  is 
conventionally dated with the failure of Lehmann Brothers in mid-September 2008 with 
trough in March 2009. 
 
10. Horizon-scanning is distinct from forecasting.  
When the challenge is about understanding discontinuities, effective horizon-scanning 
becomes necessary. It has both cultural and institutional components. There is a need to 
develop a culture of questioning in which no assumption is accepted without skepticism 
and  a  sufficiently  broad  array  of  outcomes  is  considered.  But  that  comes  to  nothing 
unless the process is institutionalized within a body that pulls together these ideas and is 
responsible for drawing general lessons and concerns. This has not happened in the UK, 
where the Standing Committee staffed jointly by the Treasury, the Bank of England and 
the Financial Services Authority failed to spot risk coming down the track and act upon 
it.  Moreover,  without  an  institution  to  draw  together  intelligence  across  relevant 
institutions, there is no scope for a complete picture to be formed. 
 
11. Culture and institutions 
The best chance of avoiding the need to repeat the LSE question lies in quickening the 
sensitivities and states of mind of those charged with trying to anticipate what economic 
and  financial  shocks  may  occur  in  future.  This  can  only  happen  where  there  is  an 
environment  which  provides  sufficient  criticism  of  assumptions  and  is  open  to 
considering a wide range of possibilities. The hierarchical structures and histories of our 
many organizations provide a major challenge to making this work effectively. Hence the 
need for a combination of cultural and institutional reform. 
 
12. Government did not help 
It  was  often  very  hard  to  persuade  the  government  to  become  properly  involved  in 
horizon-scanning. Some found it too gloomy; others saw the contingencies covered to be 
too remote. Sometimes involving Ministers in exercises related to horizon-scanning and 
the resultant contingency planning helped, but not all were keen to devote time to these. 
At the second forum of the British Academy, nobody volunteered either individually or 
institutionally  to  lead  this  task  and  there  was  skepticism  about  the  ability  to 
institutionalize such activity within government within current structures. 
 
These three excerpts from the second letter underscore the “together alone “ paradox 
within a single government more than the first letter but still neglect the international 
dimension of G&G interaction, to which we now turn. 
 
3.  HOW  GLOBALIZATION  &  GOVERNANCE  INTERACT  WITH 
CONVERGENCE 
 
3.1. An interpretative framework  12 
The mutual relationship between globalization, governance and economic performance is 
described  in  Bonaglia  et  al.  (2009)  along  the  following  lines:  a  nation’s  resource 
endowments and its productivity determine how fast it can grow and the level of its 
economic well-being in terms of income per capita, both in absolute terms and relative to 
the income frontier. Feed-backs are possible: a richer country growing fast may invest 
more resources in scientific research and technology development and thus enjoy higher 
productivity levels than a poorer, slow-growing economy. Through trade, capital flows or 
migration, globalization can influence the level of endowments available in an economy, 
or  even,  through  international  technology  transfers,  its  productivity.  Conversely  a 
country’s endowments of natural resources, labor, and capital, as well as its geographic 
location and efficiency of its production structures may determine how much it trades 
with the ROW in terms if goods, services and assets. Similarly, a country with good 
governance,  namely  a  democratic  state  with  high-quality  institutions,  effective 
corruption-free  accountable  bureaucracies,  and  a  flourishing  civil  society  may  likely 
increase the quality, if not the quantity, of its most important endowment: its own people. 
Once  more,  cause  and  effect  can  be  swapped:  well-endowed  countries  may  evolve 
towards  democratic  forms  of  government  more  easily,  or,  at  least,  they  may  afford 
investing more resources to build well-functioning institutions.  
 
While these interactions have been at the core of economics, this has not been the case of 
“how G&G interact with convergence”, perhaps because of the interdisciplinary nature of 
globalization waves, of governance innovation and of the specific context in which the 
development process unfolds. Policy and institutional responses must necessarily change 
as  the  nature  of  globalization  itself  changes.  Indeed,  three  successive  waves  of 
globalization (16th, 19th and 20th-21st centuries) have interacted with different forms of 
governance responses. G&G interaction is always defined by geography and history. In 
the  current  wave,  the  space  and  time  context  is  captured  by  convergence  to  “best 
practices”.  Economic  convergence  is  often  measured  as  the  income  distance  to  the 
frontier  represented  by  the  most  developed  group  of  countries,  often  proxied  by  the 
United  States,  even  though  GDP  per  capita  neglects  income  distribution  and 
environmental sustainability and is more and more acknowledged as a poor measure of 
economic performance (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009).  
 
The quality of democracy is even more elusive: it is often measured in terms of electoral 
competition and political participation but best understood by its constituent political and 
economic elements. Political rights are associated with free and fair elections for the 
executive  and  legislative  branches  of  power,  freedom  to  constitute  political  parties, 
freedom of association,  independence from political, religion and military  authorities, 
real possibilities of the change of power and other related aspects of the political system. 
Key  elements  of  civil  liberties  include  freedom  of  thought,  religion,  association,  free 
press and respect for the rights of minorities. The concept of economic freedom is more 
difficult to define as it may relate only to private ownership, prices being determined by 
market  forces,  de  jure  and  de  facto  entry  and  exit,  efficient  rule  of  law  and  official 
economic  regulation  guaranteeing  competition  or  also  include  the  financial  freedom 
brought  about  by  currency  convertibility,  stability  of  money  value,  central  bank 
independence and deep financial markets. Furthermore, the widely used indexes include 13 
low taxes, a small share of government spending in GDP and flexible labor markets, and 
this appears to some as too extensive a definition of economic freedom
16.  
 
Having reported results to the effect that trade openness reduces perceived corruption, 
Macedo  (2001)  claims  that  globalization  improves  governance  in  this  way  and 
emphasizes the role of expectations (“hope”) in development. The results hold across 
levels of development and after correcting for the endogeneity of perceived corruption. 
Historical  control  variables  (e.g.  protestant  tradition,  de  facto  democracy  and  OECD 
membership) are also found to be highly significant. Eichengreen and Leblang (2006) 
found a two-way interaction between democracy and globalization over the entire 1870-
2000 period
17. Similarly, in their analysis of the economic and political determinants of 
the state’s capacity to raise revenue and support private markets, Besley and Persson 
(2009) refer to the historical evidence that financial development and openness co-varied 
over the last century. Yet, the different types of freedom interact differently with the trade 
and financial globalization variables over the period 1970-2004 and the results become 
more  sensitive  to  regional  context,  and  stages  of  national  economic  and  institutional 
development.  
 
Combining history with geography, comparable GDP data in 1990 international dollars 
adapted from the Penn World Tables and population from UN sources are available in the 
Total Economy Database and Angus Maddison websites over two millennia, at least for 
countries  in  the  Eurasian  landmass.  While  the data  has  been  criticized,  especially  by 
Barro and Ursua (2008), it has become the benchmark for comparisons across time and 
space and, interestingly, originated in Marshall aid allocations through what became the 
OECD.  Under  the  current  wave  of  globalization,  moreover,  the  risk  of  cooperation 
failures is not just international but it is greater among abstract regions where there is no 
peer review - that is, outside of OECD (labeled W for West). This leaves Africa plus 
South  America  (labeled  S  for  South)  and  Asia  (labeled  E  for  East).  Maddison  treats 
founder OECD countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States as 
Western offshoots and includes Turkey, together with Japan and Korea as well as the 
former Soviet Union in Asia. Thus measured, in year 1 the E region represented about ¾ 
of world GDP and population, W 15% and S 10%, while W GDP per capita was already 
slightly higher than in the ROW.  
 
In  interpreting  the  evolution  of  the  shares  since  year  1000  for  GDP  and  population, 
presented in Figures 3 and 4 respectively, note that E population is always greater than 
60% but that the GDP share dropped to around 20%. S doubled its share of world GDP 
from  1820  to  1950.  Since  then  the  share  remained  constant  at  around  10%  with  W 
roughly equal to E. These shares are comparable to those prevailing in 1820. Yet, in 
1950, W accounted for 60% and E for 30%. In terms of population S has more than 
doubled its world share from 10% in 1820 to 15% in 1950 to 22% in 2003 while E 
                                                 
16 To enhance the quality of the democracy measure, Macedo et al. (2007a) look at the index of political 
rights and of civil liberties published by Freedom House and at the indexes of economic freedom published 
by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. 
17  Macedo  et  al.  (2007a)  reestimated  the  model  using  a  system  approach  and  confirmed  the  two-way 
interaction but found that the effect of trade openness on democracy was insignificant.  14 
dropped from the original ¾ to ½ and then rose again to 2/3. In terms of GDP per capita, 
the changes in shares are magnified with shares relative to world average of ½ for S and 
over 2/3 for E. Again, since 1950, the share of S remained around 10% but the pattern 
reversed almost completely between E and W. The exclusion of S from income growth is 
evident, especially given the impressive reversal in world population shares with rising S 
and falling W.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 
 
Together with these insights, the Maddison database allows a “millennial” perspective on 
world regions and helps to avoid the pitfalls of a purely geographic approach: regions 
may  be  historical  rather  than  geographical  and  interaction  during  the  first  wave  of 
globalization (15th century) and even the second (19th century) did not involve nearly as 
many players as the current one.  Yet the complementarity between  globalization and 
regional  integration  and  the  development  paradigm  based  on  mutual  accountability 
contained in the 2002 Monterrey declaration both suggest weak G&G interaction in Sub 
Saharan Africa (SSA), in part because of lesser knowledge relative to other parts of E and 
S. According to Maddison (2007), there are only estimates of GDP in year 1 for the five 
North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). Estimates of GDP 
for Ghana and South Africa begin in 1820 and for the remaining SSA countries in 1950. 
The share of Africa in world GDP falls from over 4% to under 3% in 1000, 1% in 1500 
and around .8% until 1820, when it begins to rise to about 1.2% in 1913. In 1950, when 
estimates for 34 new countries become available, the Africa share reaches under 4% 
again while SSA remains just under 3%. Since then both shares have declined about 1pp 
of world GDP. As for the share of SSA in Africa, it rose from around 20% until 34% in 
1913 and more than doubled to ¾ in 1950. Thereafter the SSA share in Africa GDP 
declined by more than 10 pp. The increase in population has been such that the relative 
stability in the share of world GDP implies a decline in GDP per capita of about 20 
percentage points, from 42% of world GDP per capita in 1950 to 24% in 2003. The 
corresponding figure for SSA is 18%, forecast by IMF to rise to 21% in 2013.  
 
With  respect  to  the  relative  strengths  of  the  links  between  the  current  wave  of 
globalization,  the  benchmark  measure  of  freedoms  and  convergence,  the  empirical 
findings  of  Macedo  et  al  (2007)  reveal  that  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  had  a 
significant impact in the run-up to the third globalization while feedbacks were somewhat 
weaker. Further work is needed to understand the long-run dynamics and sustainability of 
this  global  system,  in  particular  the  mechanisms  that  could  enforce  or  reinforce  the 
expected  positive  effect  of  globalization  on  both  convergence  and  freedoms.  The 
particular interaction which involves democracy reflects historical, geographical, social, 
cultural,  institutional  and  economic  factors  and  the  method  employed  focuses  on  the 
economic aspect of this relationship. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) found trade-offs of a 
cultural  nature  in  the  interaction  between  democracy  and  growth:  democracy  brings 
additional  pressure  for  current  consumption,  even  to  the  extent  of  mortgaging  future 
savings  but  it  also  leads  to  higher  human  capital,  thereby  promoting  growth.  A 
complementary explanation of the G&G interaction can be based on the manner in which 
diversity, be it socio-cultural, economic or religious, is addressed by a given society.  15 
 
In sum, allowing for the quality of democracy lowers the overall effect of globalization 
on  democracy.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  hypothesis  that  globalization’s  effects  on 
democracy are mediated by slow-moving cultural values. This would imply that such 
variables might be accounted for by selecting groups of like-minded countries, like the 
OECD, for which the effect of  globalization on freedoms would be stronger but this 
would neglect the convergence dimension, more visible on a global scale. The millennial 
perspective on world economic growth in W, E and S illustrated this but there are as 
many  significant  differences  within  these  broad  regions  as  there  are  between  them, 
depending on the purpose at hand. To extract information about dominant players by 
issue-areas it helps to focus on the economic dimension as measured by the level of GDP 
in the comparable units presented above.  
 
3.2 Diversity in G&G interaction  
Previous waves of globalization did not involve as many players as the current one, and 
their  relative  positions  have  been  changing  fast,  especially  since  the  advent  of  the 
BRICs
18. Following the concept of interdependence in Cooper (1964) and Keohane and 
Nye  (1977,  2000),  Nye  (2002)  suggested  a  chessboard  with  three  levels,  security, 
diplomacy  (intergovernmental  cooperation)  and  civil  society  (transnational  relations 
among private actors) to conclude that US maintained dominance on security relations 
was accompanied by a relative decline in diplomatic and private relations. While the 
relevant dominance dimensions lead to a matrix with four rather than three columns, we 
label it the Nye matrix. Aside from the military dimension, finance and trade would seem 
necessary but not sufficient because of the importance of factor endowments (land for 
short) as a cause of the international trade in goods and services which underlies most 
relations  on  the  diplomatic  and  private  level.  Thus  the  dominance  matrix  in  table  1 
divides world GDP in 2006 into four quarters, arranged in decreasing order of response 
capability: 
•  North America (US, Canada, Mexico, labeled NA);  
•  European Union, labeled EU;  
•  Association of South East Asian Nations plus China, Korea and Japan, the so-




ROW accounts for ¼ of world GDP and ½ of the world population, including significant 
nations (Brazil, Russia, India, the other three BRICs) and salient regions (Africa and the 
Middle East, where most of around 70 “fragile states” are located). The four columns of 
the dominance matrix on issues of defense, finance, trade and land, i.e. endowments both 
                                                 
18 From 17 to 29 January, a series of articles appeared in the FT celebrating this acronym introduced in 
2001 by Jim O’Neill and popularized in the celebrated car race with the G-7 (Goldmann Sachs 2003). The 
idea was to embed the so-called China problem with India as the world’s largest democracy, Russia, who 
joined the G-7 in 1998 seven years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its “second world” and 
Brazil who still seemed distant but reassuring. A box explained why South Africa did not quite make the 
grade but should be watched together with the large ASEAN member states and those who had joined 
OECD, such as Korea and Mexico. The BRICSAM project at CIGI reflects the larger list, which became 
the G-20. 16 
for agricultural and raw materials, illustrate the dominance of NA, EU, EA plus ROW. 
The US dominates the first two, even though in finance the creation of the euro in 1999 
may  lead  to  a  shared  dominance  with  the  dollar.  The  new  development  is  that  the 
members of the Chang Mai initiative trade more with NA and EU than each side of the 
Atlantic trades with the other. Nevertheless, the fourth quarter of world GDP remains the 
most  endowed  in  people,  land  and  raw  materials  so  that  ROW  cannot  be  seen  as  a 
residual of East and South. Taking a global (rather than a regional or national) view 
suggests  the  importance  of  governance  innovation,  but  not  enough  is  known  about 
building  global  coalitions  for  change  given  that  dominant  players  generate  free  rider 
problems and this prevents international cooperation. The “together alone” paradox stems 
from the inability or willingness of dominant players to foster international governance 
innovation.  
 
Under growing financial globalization, the commitment of authorities who seek exchange 
rate stability through the adoption of fixed but adjustable parities is likely to be tested. As 
discussed  in  section  5  below,  the  debate  about  the  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime 
under financial market integration is sometimes described as “don´t fix don´t float” to the 
extent that both polar cases have their difficulties. One way of organizing the debate is 
the portfolio balance model of exchange rate determination, according to which volatility 
is scaled by the ratio of trade to finance (Kouri 1983). This insight has been applied to the 
international  adjustment  process  by  Kouri  and  Macedo  (1978),  Krugman  (1983), 
Blanchard et al (2005) and it is helpful in understanding global imbalances, especially 
between the US and China. The argument that, under a fixed exchange rate between the 
renminbi and the dollar, China becomes a periphery of the US has been made by Dooley 
at al (2005). It is based on the persistence of effective capital controls between the two 




Data from Cohen-Setton and Pisani-Ferry (2007) is used to compute the Kouri ratio in the 
three regions above, showing that the trade dominance of East Asia does not carry over to 
financial issues. External financial assets and liabilities are about 8 times the annual trade 
flows in 2006 but only 3 in EA (table 2)
20. To the extent that regions are historical rather 
than geographical, it is easier to interpret EU, or even NA, than EA and the same can be 




As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  the  crisis  originated  in  advanced  economies 
(especially US and UK) and Asia is mentioned in connection with the rising deficit in the 
US balance of payments. Indeed the complacency about systemic risks is associated with 
the Bretton Woods II view of the US as an importer of last resort. It is there that the 
                                                 
19 In addition to the portfolio balance argument mentioned above in the text, financial globalization erodes 
capital controls. The complacency about these global imbalances associated to so called Bretton Woods II 
view advocated by Dooley et al (2005).  
20 There is no data comparable to the table presented by Cohen-Setton and Pisani-Ferry (2007) but Haldane 
(2009) provides references to work carried out at the Bank of England.   17 
interaction between G&G turned negative, spreading to the UK in early in 2007. Yet the 
impact on the eurozone and the ROW took an additional year, in part because the US 
recession of late 2007 was not immediately recognized. Successive bailout programs on 
both sides of the Atlantic were conducted in an haphazard and incoherent manner in the 
face of financial panic. They were accompanied or followed by stimulus packages. This 
was surprising given the strong financial links across the North Atlantic but reflect fault 
lines in national and regional financial supervision. The recapitalization of banks using 
taxpayer’s money was finally agreed by the UK and adapted to the eurozone but the 
different systems of financial supervision continue to prevent a common position in the 
EU.  This  is  not  an  issue  of  monetary  policy  but  rather  of  information  sharing  about 
systemic actors, part of the macroprudential framework called for by the BIS (mentioned 
in point 2 of the July 2009 letter to the Queen). The German model prevents central 
banks  from  acting  as  lenders  of  last  resort  because  using  taxpayer’s  money  might 
compromise their independence. Central banks are closest to commercial banks and other 
financial intermediaries, yet, more than two years after the crisis, the ECB does not have 
information on the systemic banks in the eurozone! This is particularly serious because, 
even before the tensions in the most indebted countries in the eurozone began to reverse 
the strengthening of the euro-dollar rate in late 2009, attacks on weak currencies were 
being  replaced  by  attacks  on  suspicious  balance  sheets:  nothing  in  left  is  right  and 
nothing in right is left. 
 
The  surprise  of  the  global  crisis,  recognized  in  both  letters  to  the  Queen  but  UK 
institutions were more severely judged in the second than in the first. Similarly, the blame 
on the economics profession – which has become more and more explicit since the fall of 
Lehmann Brothers – is muted in the letters of the British Academy. As documented in the 
previous section, the role of expectations as guide to the effectiveness of policy has been 
revisited,  in  ways  that  discard  fully  rational,  expectations
21.  Malhoney  and  Mulherin 
(2003) provide evidence on the speed and accuracy of price discovery by studying stock 
returns and trading volume surrounding the crash of the space shuttle Challenger. While 
the event was widely observed, it took several months for an esteemed panel to determine 
which of the mechanical components failed during the launch. By contrast, in the period 
immediately following the crash, securities trading in the four main shuttle contractors 
seemingly singled out the firm that manufactured the faulty component. Much of the 
price  discovery  occurred  during  a  trading  halt  of  the  firm  responsible  for  the  faulty 
component but the authors are unable to detect the actual manner in which particular 
informed traders induced price discovery. Thus it cannot be concluded that prices fully 
reflect all available information, as claimed by the efficient market hypothesis and firmly 
believed until the current crisis. Instead, the adaptive market hypothesis put forth by Lo 
(2009) implies that individuals make mistake, learn and adapt and that competition drives 
                                                 
21 The cartoon inspired by Voltaire’s Candide is quoted in note 7 above and related work featured in FT of 
27 November in note 6. The notion of “diverse diversification” attributed to Nicholas Beale of Sciteb, a 
London  consultancy,  and  David  Rand  is  evoked  together  with  parallels  from  “medical  epidemiology” 
featured in the work of Lo (2009: “the US should set up a capital markets safety board to manage systemic 
risk, modeled on America’s National Transportation Safety Board” according to the FT), Haldane (2009: 
“the banking world could do with an equivalent of the WHO” according to the FT). Zoologist Robert May 
is quoted as saying “the more I hear about financial economics, the more I am struck by its similarity to 
ecology in the 1960s”: talk about humility! 18 
adaptation and innovation. Just like there are “rational herds” instances abound of the 
wisdom and madness of crowds
22.  
 
The Nye matrix and the Kouri ratio pictured in tables 1 And 2 respectively are relevant 
explanatory devices for the global crisis, but this does not mean that the current crisis is 
essentially “different” from previous ones as emphasized by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 
and 2010). Diversity in G&G interaction is evident in the data gathered in tables 3 and 4, 
taken  from  their  book.  The  list  of  sovereign  defaults  shows  the  interaction  between 
financial reputation and democracy in Europe over eight centuries. When political rights 
decrease the capacity to tax, countries become serial defaulters but they are also capable 
of graduating. In Table 4, the share of years in default since independence or 1800 is 
similar in Brazil and Spain while France stands out for the share in a banking crisis. The 
change  from  1979  to  2008  in  the  credit  rating  from  Institutional  Investor  shows 
similarities between Portugal and Spain.  
 
Tables 3 and 4  
 
The management of diversity as a determinant of G&G interaction in the Portuguese case 
is  described  in  Macedo  and  Pereira  (2007)  and  Macedo  et  al.  (2009a)  essentially  by 
gathering  insights  from  economists  and  historians.  For  example,  the  departure  of  the 
Crown to Brazil in 1807 just before the arrival of French troops and the liberal revolution 
of the 1820s influenced the transition of Brazil from empire to republic in 1890, while the 
successive  revolutions  in  1910,  1918,  1926  and  1974  certainly  influenced  the 
independence of the five African territories and their own very diverse experience with 
political and economic freedom. In particular, the presumption that political freedom is 
incompatible  with  financial  instead  of  complementary  damaged  financial  reputation 
considerably, as shown in Table 3 above. While one bankruptcy is recorded from 1300 
until 1812 (against 7 in Spain and 9 in France), six are recorded until 1890 (against 7 in 
Spain and zero in France and Brazil). The experience with IMF adjustment programs in 
the 1970s and 1980s may also be relevant to understand how countries like Cape Verde 
and Mozambique considered financial reputation, as detailed in Macedo et al (2007) and 
Macedo and Pereira (2009). Unfortunately, the lessons seem to be forgotten in Portugal 
and this is making the budgetary situation more vulnerable to changing market sentiment 
about the eurozone as discussed in the section 4.2 below. 
 
Besley and Persson (2009) look at how do risks of violent conflict affect the incentives to 
invest in state building, whether it matters that conflicts are external or internal to the 
state, when large states are associated with higher income levels and growth rates than 
small states and what relations to expect between resource rents, civil wars and economic 
development. About the origins of state capacity, they show that taxation and financial 
development  are  both  positively  correlated  with  income  across  countries  and  that 
causation runs from income to market support and taxation, not the other way around. 
                                                 
22 Cooperative governance schemes like the first two G-20 summits did not manage to revive bank credit in 
part because banks feared fire sales and consequently did not want to sell troubled assets (Diamond and 
Rajan,  2009).  The  way  in  which  evolution  determines  market  dynamics  becomes  specific  to  the 
institutional and organizational setup. 19 
This is consistent with the argument that financial development is positively correlated 
with  openness  to  international  trade,  as  the  latter  expands  the  returns  to  reallocating 
capital. Investment in state capacity is declining in the share of resource rents in GDP 
because only produced output is taxed and legal capacity is only useful for produced 
output.  War  is  important  not  only  for  building  fiscal,  but  also  legal  capacity.  While 
external defense is a natural example, the result applies to any national common-interest 
program, such as a universal welfare state or health program. Indeed, if the demand for 
public goods is expected to be high, any group that is in power has a greater incentive to 
invest  in  fiscal  capacity  to  finance  future  common-interest  spending.  The  incumbent 
group faces a smaller risk of the opposition using a larger fiscal capacity to redistribute 
against  the  incumbent.  The  effect  of  instability  is  larger  in  countries  with  less 
representative political systems. Conversely, the effect of political stability on economic 
institutions was particularly large in England after the Glorious Revolution. During a 
parliament dominated by the Whigs for more than 40 years, tax income rose to 20% of 
GDP, and institutions for charging excise and indirect taxes were put in place. In the 
second half of the 18th century, continued state capacity building by the dominant British 
elite culminated in the launch of an income tax during the Napoleonic wars, when the 
government raised taxes equal to a remarkable 36% of GDP.  
 
3.3. Culture and development goals 
Developed  countries stand to gain from contributing, bilaterally and multilaterally, to 
policies that turn developing countries into more open economies, better integrated in the 
world  economy.  But  globalization  can  only  bring  lasting  benefits  if  the  governance 
response is appropriate and diverse G&G interactions make it harder to find what such 
response might be. In particular, trust between local and foreign partners is even more 
crucial in developing countries, where most of the population is in a situation of absolute 
poverty and the state depends on external assistance because it is virtually devoid of a 
working  tax  administration.  Even  in  the  absence  of  armed  conflict  in  the  country  or 
surrounding region, trust between all the partners and entities that finance development 
must rest on MDGs and on policies that sustain economic growth. The prerequisite of 
institutional change required by such policies confirms the importance of cultural factors. 
Culture affects such personal traits honesty, thrift, willingness to work hard and openness 
to strangers, in one word, trust. The example that is very clear here is the role of the 
family. Institutions such as the family are very different in different parts of the world 
and as mentioned below this has a well defined impact on economic development. A 
related example is sharing, which is part of Africa's cultural inheritance. Along these 
lines, the Monterrey declaration favors public-private partnerships for development, an 
examples are given below.  
 
With respect to the religious dimension of culture, Barro and McCleary (2003) find a 
complex  pattern  of  interaction,  where  the  effect  depends  on  the  extent  of  believing 
relative  to  belonging:  for  given  church  attendance  (belonging),  increases  in  some 
religious  beliefs  –  notably  heaven,  hell  and  an  afterlife  –  tend  to  increase  economic 
growth.  For  given  beliefs,  on  the  other  hand,  increases  in  church  attendance  tend  to 
reduce economic growth. The concern with morality and the theological foundation of 
culture has increased in the context of the global economic crisis, where, according to the 20 
latest  encyclical  letter,  the  love  of  truth  has  been  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  crude 
materialism.  Benedict  XVI  urges  that  this  crisis  becomes  “an  opportunity  for 
discernment, in which to shape a new vision for the future” The Pope attributes the crisis 
itself to badly managed and largely speculative financial dealing but he resists the current 
fashion of blaming all existing world problems on the market economy. There are two 
practical implications of “love in truth”. First: Moral priorities of generosity go beyond 
rights and duties. Second: The common good extends the good of individuals who live in 
society. The worldwide diffusion of prosperity should not be held up by projects that are 
protectionist: more not less trade is needed. Institutional cooperation is needed outside 
the usual players: the defense of multilateralism goes hand in hand with the realization 
that structural insecurity generates anti productive attitudes wasteful of human resources. 




Culture as learning is reflected in the evolution of US female labor force participation 
over a century. In her Marshall Lecture at the European Economic Association meeting in 
Vienna, Raquel Fernandez discussed the epidemiological approach as a way to separate 
the  effect  of  institutions  and  other  traditional  economic  variables  from  culture. 
Controlling for a large variety of socio-economic indicators, Fernandez (2007) shows that 
(white) men whose mothers worked while they were growing up tend to be married to 
women who also work: a mother who works increases the probability that man’s wife 
works from 39% to 71%. Moreover men brought up by working mother either prefer 
women  who  work  or  are  preferred  by  women  who  want  to  work  (preference 
transmission).  For  children  born  1930-35  (not  for  earlier  cohorts),  more  women  with 
children worked in states with higher mobilization rates and more men were brought up 
by working women, so that it became more attractive for married women to work in these 
states. Since development also involves the expansion of women’s economic and political 
rights, then it implies declining fertility. To find out whether cross-country differences 
are driven by genetic or environmental (including culture) factors, she compares a health 
outcome (e.g. heart disease) for immigrants with that for natives and asks whether health 
outcomes  converge.  If  they  do,  one  can  conclude  that  the  environment  caused  it. 
However  the  converse  is  not  true.  Health  outcomes  may  differ  because 
economic/institutional factors or culture might play a quantitatively more important role 
than genetics in cross-country differences in an economic outcome (e.g. savings)
24.  
 
Rising  income  divergence  within  and  between  countries  was  once  an  inheritance  of 
import-substituting  industrialization  and  central  planning  but  subsequent  attempts  at 
promoting convergence by raising the growth rate of poor countries over that of rich ones 
have  rarely  been  sustained
25.  Maddison  (2001)  explains  economic  performance  by 
                                                 
23 According to Sirico (2009), followed in the text, Caritas in veritate is in the tradition of St Thomas 
Aquinas, Frédéric Bastiat, Willem Roepke and even Friedrich von Hayek. 
24 When she addresses the behavior of immigrants differentially affected by shocks (language, employment, 
etc.), Fernandez (2007, 2009) contrasts assimilation and selection. 
25 Sachs and Warner (1994) showed that the conditions for convergence could be summarized by property 
rights  protection  (i.e.  good  governance)  and  openness  to  international  trade  (i.e.  globalization). 
Unfortunately,  in  their  (1995),  the  governance  variable  was  dropped  so  that  the  importance  of  G&G 21 
conquest,  international  trade  and  investment  and  technological  and  institutional 
innovation, as captured by governance. Maddison (2007) demonstrates that development 
involves  an  increase  in  productive  capacity  and  rising  per  capita  incomes,  rising  life 
expectation from 1820 (24 years in 1000 and the rise was almost imperceptible until 
then): now the average infant can expect to survive 66 years and the projection for 2030 
is over 70. His figures have largely determined the productivity levels used in accounting 
for the sources of growth. Using new data on human capital, Daniel Cohen shows in 
Macedo et al (2002) that there is not a unique factor behind the poverty of nations. Poor 
countries are "slightly" disadvantaged in each one of the factors behind prosperity. But 
the combination of these slight weaknesses results in huge income gaps. This is why he 
claims that more rather than less globalization would make positive G&G interactions 
more widespread. Yet, the difficulties in measurement and interpretation of changes in 
cultural and governance variables should be kept in mind. For example, many of the 
available  governance  indicators  are  very  arbitrary  and  their  use  could  damage  peer 
pressure instead of promoting it, in part because changes in these indicators are not easy 
to interpret (Arndt and Oman 2006). In addition to cultural diversity, then, unavailability 
of data and inadequate analysis thereof are reasons for available indicators to damage 
peer pressure instead of promoting it.  
 
Looking at the origins of such governance response confirms these fears but does not 
suggest  any  superior  alternative  among  advanced  countries  as  well  as  in  Africa;  the 
absence of emerging markets at least until the G20 summits is rather the worry here. As 
detailed in the annex (which adapts the comparison of IMF, OECD and EU methods in 
Thygesen, 2002), international peer review began with the post-World War II Marshall 
plan and the creation of the European Payments Union. The Organization for European 
Economic  Cooperation  which  administered  Marshall  Aid  was  replaced  in  1961  by 
OECD, which has a Western membership except for Australia, Japan, Korea and New 
Zealand. OECD, known as the “rich man’s club” because its Development Assistance 
Committee gathered virtually all official donors, has adapted its peer review methods to 
emerging  markets  on  a  voluntary  basis,  in  what  is  called  a  “surveillance”  of  non-
members. Nevertheless, it stands for the polar opposite to Africa, where incomes per 
capita are among the lowest in the world, they share a call for better governance through 
peer  review.  Thus  attempts  at  promoting  mutual  knowledge  in  Africa  reflect  the 
establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism in July 2002 and the fact that 29 
countries signed up. The acceleration of reports is evident: 5 countries were examined 
until 2007, 4 in 2008 and 6 expected for 2009 (more in African Economic Outlook 
2009, p. 75).  
 
Before the creation of AU, parallels of NEPAD with the Bretton Woods institutions or 
with the Marshall plan were made by African leaders. Indeed, the UN system, the IMF, 
the World Bank and the WTO collaborated, for the first time, in the process leading to the 
conference  in  Monterrey,  Mexico  in  2002.  The  Monterrey  declaration,  dubbed  the 
Washington consensus “with a sombrero”, was not implemented and the same can be said 
about the NEPAD as a continental initiative. Worse yet, sub-regional groupings such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
interaction was lost. Another caveat to ususal convergence measures is the exclusive focus on GDP growth, 
which is criticized by Stiglitz et al (2009), known as the report of the “Happiness Commission”. 22 
the  Southern  Africa  Development  Community,  which  come  under  the  rubric  “South-
South co-operation”, did not thrive either. The same can be said about traditional post-
colonial organizations such as the Commonwealth or the Organisation Mondiale pour la 
Francophonie as well as multi-regional bodies (such as SEGIB the Secretariat for Ibero-
American Co-operation  based in Madrid or CPLP),  where the  weight  of the “North” 
relative to the “South” is smaller than in their English- or French-speaking counterparts. 
Nevertheless, OECD peer reviews have already been carried out for non-members. They 
could certainly be adapted to economic co-operation and development among groups of 
non-member countries, from regional ones to others based on some perceived cultural or 
linguistic trait. The idea of a club as a set of like-minded people carries over to that of a 
group of like minded countries whose commitment to democracy, market economy and 
world development is reinforced by mutually agreed procedures for policy review and 
evaluation. The success of the Marshall plan reflects this fact: a reform process can only 
be sustained when culture is used as a vehicle for change rather than against it. Even 
though deep differences in political and social cultures remain and may even widen under 
the  threat  of  international  terrorism,  economic  cultures  have  been  converging  and 
democracy has spread well beyond the OECD membership.  
 
Progress toward reaching the MDGs continues therefore to face two major governance 
obstacles. First, international organizations do not seem able to work together. Second, 
the EU is the largest donor but its policies are not consistent across the 27 members, 
hindering  visibility.  These  two  obstacles  reflect  the  difficulties  of  international 
governance innovation. Thus the G7 helped global governance in 1970s but lost initial 
impetus with gradual incorporation of Russia and the complexity of the enlargement to 
emerging  markets  of  systemic  importance,  such  as  the  BRICs.  Morphing  into  G20 
suggests momentum, but the September 2008 financial crisis and the existence of an 
informal group of finance ministers called the G20 explains that the perceived success of 
the three meetings at leaders level has been rather more on finance than on trade and 
development.   
 
Policies for international reconstruction and development began with the Marshall plan 
and have been most effective in Asia, despite OECD’s mostly European membership. 
This “reformers´ club” has promoted the convergence in economic policy cultures and 
even  in  most  other  areas  of  non-military  policies.  Moreover,  the  discreet  partnership 
launched in 2002 between NEPAD and OECD grew into the Africa Partnership Forum 
and the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005, which involved the stakeholders in 
the Monterrey process, including business associations, absent from the evaluation of the 
Comprehensive  Development  Framework  described  in  World  Bank  (2003).  This  is 
different from the Washington consensus of 1990s because of the process of “mutual 
accountability” between donor and recipient. Thus the Paris declaration led to the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA), approved on the eve of the financial crisis. Even though it 
favored North-South-South cooperation, the AAA has encountered even greater obstacles 
in having donors deliver on their commitments. The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty 
in late 2009 has not simplified the European architecture for development cooperation.  
 23 
Before  the  crisis,  the  world  was  on  track  for  halving  poverty  by  2015  (with  a  1990 
benchmark). Between 2000 and 2005: 120 million people out of poverty 2 million lives 
saved  through  reduced  child  mortality;  30  million  additional  6-12  children  going  to 
school; 30 million additional families having access to drinking water; Boys and girls in 
equal numbers in primary school. Yet, global poverty progress was largely due to rapid 
growth in giant Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Most developing 
countries  were  projected  not  to  meet  most  MDGs:  although  necessary,  growth  alone 
cannot do the job. Progress on MDGs is shaped by the global economic environment, by 
domestic policies and, for the poorest countries, how much and how well aid is delivered 
and used. Each one of these three factors looks worse with the global crisis. Tackling 
chronic poverty will remain a priority after 2015: MDG achievements will need to be 




Based  on  its  experience  of  economic  integration,  the  EU  can  play  a  specific  role  in 
helping poor countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, to reduce internal barriers to 
trade, correct market failures and increase regional ownership of reforms through peer-
reviewing. As Bourguignon et al (2008) acknowledged in their mid September report on 
MDGs, much needs to be done at the EU and its member states level to push this agenda 
forward. The deterioration due to the crisis has made it much harder to achieve policy 
coherence, particularly in trade, migration and development policies. Scaling up aid and 
delivering it more effectively is another major challenge in an environment where the EU 
seems  to  unable  to  bring  about  governance  innovation  –  even  though  the 
complementarity between globalization and regional integration suggests positive G&G 
interactions,  with  implications  for  freedoms  and  values.  Positive  interaction  found 
between democracy  and globalization remains  when measures of political, social  and 
economic  freedom  are  used.  The  conclusion  is  that  freedoms  strongly  interact  with 
globalization, given income per capita, because the effect is mediated by slow-moving 
cultural values. Lack of state capacity is a major obstacle to development. In particular 
the capacity to govern  causes  growth and low  capacity to tax is associated with low 
income. Causation runs from income to market support and taxation, not the other way 
around.  
 
In other words, pro-poor growth illustrates a positive G&G interaction, whereas negative 
interaction  hurts  growth  and  development.  Reaching  the  eight  MDGs  in  2015 
presupposes sustained economic growth in addition to better governance and more aid, as 
recommended  at  the  Monterrey  Conference.  The  eighth  goal  (to  develop  a  global 
partnership for development) reflects disappointment with the performance of developing 
countries  which  seemed  to  follow  the  policy  recommendations  of  the  so-called 
Washington  consensus  during  the  1990s.  As  governance  improvements  were  not 
commensurate with the challenges of globalization, especially in what concerns financial 
markets, some developing countries interrupted the long term convergence process even 
before the global crisis struck. 
                                                 
26 Contzen (2010) quotes an estimate of DFID according to which the crisis delayed the progress to the 
MDGs by three years. No wonder that a workshop convened by DFID in Brussels June 2009 on what to do 
beyond 2015 conclude: restore growth! 24 
 
National capacity- and institution-building is decisive in developing countries because the 
private sector and civil society are less organised than the state, which even in fragile 
states remains a point of entry. The private sector and civil society are not only important 
from a national, regional and continental perspective but also from a local perspective, 
due to the proximity of business and of civil society to people's specific problems. The 
reason why the principle of proximity to various levels of government is fundamental in 
European  integration  doctrine,  even  if  more  flexible  integration  would  make  it  more 
important in practice, as discussed in the next section. The local dimension is essential for 
the credibility of what the private sector may be able to do at national, regional and 
continental levels because collaboration with the state has to be assessed from the bottom 
up. In this context, public-private partnerships help bring about policies at the national, 
regional  and  global  levels  capable  of  promoting  good  governance  and  sustaining  the 
reform process. The use of public-private partnerships in reconciling seemingly divergent 
interests between the public sector and private business can be extended to development 
areas because all parties gain from a concerted approach – but the existing institutions 
often  discourage  co-operation.  To  openly  discuss  what  the  interests  of  various 
stakeholders  are  and  to  seek  a  solution  that  best  satisfies  most  interested  parties  is 
certainly preferable to imposing policies in exchange for official assistance.  
 
Trust  between  social  and  economic  partners,  an  environment  favorable  to  business 
development, and better co-ordination between development finance institutions may all 
contribute to positive governance responses. As such, they also help translate the MDGs 
into national and global policy proposals as required by the eighth goal, which features 
targets for aid, trade and debt relief. In this context, public-private partnerships become 
an important instrument in creating an environment favorable to the normal functioning 
of  business  and  the  attraction  of  investment,  an  essential  element  in  generating 
employment and creating wealth. To the extent that they broaden the knowledge base for 
policy  dialogue  between  business  and  the  public  sector  (points  24  and  25  of  the 
Monterrey Declaration), public-private partnerships help to define the common good and 
the best ways to bring it about in each country. 
 
The longer-term objective of public-private partnerships is to improve the environment 
for  the  domestic  private  sector  and  to  build  confidence  and  trust  between  partners, 
including the providers of finance for development. The concept is applicable to a wide 
range  of  countries  wishing  to  respond  to  the  challenges  of  good  governance  and  to 
develop the private sector. Experience has shown that the transition tends to be rather 
slow from the usual adversarial relation between the public and private sectors to the 
desired partnership relationship in search of the common good and the best forms of 
attaining it.  
 
Social dialogue has proven to be a successful investment in the progressive building of 
trust relationships between agents of the public and private sectors. For this to occur, the 
data and information that serves as a basis for such dialogue should be locally developed 
and not provided by external sources, so that the local public and private sectors can feel 
a sense of ownership of the information they use in their deliberations and decisions. The 25 
advantages of ownership do not override the need for the policies to have technical and 
economic  merit.  Only  in  this  way  will  developing  economies  be  able  to  attract  the 
external public and private, bilateral and multilateral, resources that are indispensable for 
the national effort to be successful.  
 
It is expected that public-private partnerships will lead to a closer and more effective 
communication  between  the  public  and  private  sectors.  Experience  shows  that  by 
participating jointly in working groups, seminars and conferences organized to discuss 
matters of common interest, both sectors gain a better appreciation of the concerns and 
interests  of  the  other  party.  Over  time,  the  initial  defensive  positions  give  way  to  a 
partnership  between  different  agents  concerned  with  achieving  a  common  objective. 
Examples are innovative forms of financing that allow more firms to take advantage of 
positive prospects while smoothing the impact of bad times; or indicators of economic 
activity that all economic agents may utilize to assess cyclical perspectives. The aim is to 
facilitate dialogue between national agents and to provide locally produced economic 
information to foreign investors and other partners. 
 
This broadening of the knowledge base will in turn promote the adaptive capacity of 
society as a whole, a key to fast growth. The success of any public-private partnership 
will  naturally  depend  on  the  preparation  and  motivation  of  each  party.  The  better 
organized and prepared is the private sector, the more easily it can take coherent positions 
and contribute positively to discussions and to decision taking. Similarly, a local private 
sector that is well-organized and technically competent can more easily be an effective 
partner  to  foreign  investors,  avoiding  foreign  capture  of  all  good  investment 
opportunities. The provision of technical assistance in the context of a public-private 
partnership can thus help private sector associations to mature or, at very least, to point 
out  the  major  shortcomings  and  indicate  where  assistance  could  most  profitably  be 
applied. Business associations such as those gathered in the Business and Investment 
Advisory Committee of the OECD or initiatives such as the European Round Table of 
Industrialists  have  been  active  in  promoting  and  disseminating  comparisons  of  best 
practices in various aspects of corporate governance and investment climate. Yet these 
initiatives remain unusual in developing countries. 
 
3. 5. CPLP and mutual knowledge 
Portugal  and  Brazil,  five  AU  members  (Angola,  Cape  Verde,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe) and make up CPLP, with headquarters in Lisbon and 
under  Portuguese  presidency  of  its  council  in  2008-2010.  Like  Portugal  as  a  tourist 
destination  in  the  early  1970s,  CPLP  remains  a  “well  kept  secret”  of  culture-based 
multilateralism: “the mutual friendship among members” mentioned in the treaty is not 
enough to build a global partnership for development from the perspective of the group, 
what is called global lusofonia to underline that the concern goes beyond CPLP members. 
The  contribution  of  Brazil  was  decisive  in  the  creation  of  CPLP  in  1996,  the  joint 
presidency  of  the  secretariat  and  of  the  council  in  2003/2004,  and  the  creation  of 
Business Council (CE) with a secretariat at ELO - Portuguese Association for Economic 
Development  and  Co-operation.  The  two  more  advanced  members  feared  that  an 
economic dimension would trigger expectations of larger development assistance towards 26 
PALOP (and Timor since 2000). Yet the Herfindahl number equivalent is 1,4 - the same 
as for NAFTA - and GDP shares of the four larger countries were never smaller than 
99.75%. The Bissau declaration aims at monitoring progress with respect to reaching 
MDGs. It emphasizes that the underlying philosophy is one of “genuine partnership for 
development”,  based  on  “mutual  knowledge”,  an  original  concept  which  suggests 
governance innovation.  
 
That the national and regional common good can be complementary has implications for 
the complementarity between regional and global surveillance noted in the Monterrey 
consensus.  Another  example  is  provided  by  the  multi-regional  CPLP:  Portugal  and 
Brazil, its two more developed members stand to gain from contributing to the integration 
of the other six in the world economic system. For example, in response to a proposal 
from  Brazil,  externally  funded  work  on  CPLP’s  poorest  countries  was  added  to  the 
Development Centre’s activities (OECD, 2003, p. 52) in 2000. Support of public private 
dialogue was the main purpose of a Mozambique pilot project and of its extension to 
other African countries, like the Democratic Republic of Congo, reinforcing coverage of 
the  Southern  Africa  Development  Community  (Macedo,  2003).  This  was  a  first 
contribution to inserting CPLP in the quest for “mutual knowledge”. The gains from joint 
actions with systemically significant emerging markets who were or became members of 
the Development Centre, such as  India or South Africa, can be even  greater if these 
actions enhance the South-South co-operation dimension without diluting the common 
cultural  allegiance.  In  this  regard  the  attendance  at  the  first  Ministerial  Forum  for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries in 
Macau in 2003 provided a good precedent for greater visibility of work carried out under 
OECD  auspices.  The  presentation  of  OECD  work  convinced  the  national  authorities 
present,  especially  the  host  country,  that  peer  review  mechanisms  help  improve  the 
governance  response  to  globalization  and  signal  the  rising  financial  reputation  of 
emerging  markets,  thereby  accelerating  reforms  and  promoting  the  agenda  of  South-
South co-operation.  
 
In accordance with a decision taken at the Maputo Summit in July 2000, the first CPLP 
Business Forum was held in Lisbon in June 2002 and decided to set up a CE, whose 
objectives were listed at the Brasilia Summit in July 2002. They were: (i) to enhance 
capacity building of business associations in member countries as well as to promote 
cooperation  between  them;  (ii)  to  create  a  business  network  in  the  regions  where 
lusophone enterprises operate; (iii) to encourage strategic partnerships; (iv) to promote 
innovative  financing  methods,  and  (v)  to  support  local  private  sectors  in  the  public-
private dialogue. Progress towards meeting these objectives was reviewed at the second 
Business Forum, held in Fortaleza, Brazil in June 2003 after the Brazil-Africa Forum. At 
the Coimbra Ministerial meeting, it was also decided that the Business Council should 
begin operation in 2004 and the communiqué stated that CPLP Ministers welcomed the 
collaboration with OECD in the framework of NEPAD and encouraged further initiatives 
along the same lines. Similar encouragement was voiced with respect to UNESCO and 
the UN World Food Program, also represented at the ministerial. The message was that 27 
the various experiences with public-private partnerships have improved governance and 
mutual understanding between public and private partners
27. 
 
Facilitating  North-South-South  cooperation  also  provides  a  European  identity  in 
development co-operation which has been lacking even though the EU (including the 
Commission  and  member  states)  is  the  largest  donor.  Greater  North-South-South 
partnership, as envisaged by the AAA may be easier in areas where mutual knowledge is 
greater. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), housed 
at the World Bank, is the international body that sparked the “green revolution” in crop 
yields during the 1960s and 1970s which alleviated poverty throughout Asia. Due to a 
lack of support for implementation in Africa, the “green revolution” did not benefit the 
poor there. Symbolically, the first meeting of the CGIAR in Africa announced a major 
reform, implemented throughout 2009 and to be assessed at a stakeholders’ conference in 




Contzen  (2009)  discusses  the  effect  of  the  global  crisis  on  the  role  of  Science  and 
Technology for Development and called for a further reinforcement of the knowledge 
base by capacity building in Science and Technology, using all forms of partnership, 
North-South-South,  regional,  public/private  and  for  development  of  technological 
infrastructures, notably in  Information and Communication Technologies.  In addition, 
stimulating more local innovation which contributes to good capacity utilization can take 
place through four complementary approaches: 
1.  Giving more emphasis on innovation driven by local demand, notably the societal 
demand  
2.  Devoting more attention to organizational innovation adapted to local conditions 
3.  Reaping the benefits of new innovative developments, notably in the energy and 
environmental fields, arising from the stimulus packages of developed countries 
4.  Using  the  model  of  “non  R&D  innovators”  developed  successfully  in  Europe 
(cloud computing, for ex.)  
 
One reason why North-South-South co-operation may be the way to go is that questions 
arise about the effect of cultural and linguistic proximity on the effectiveness of peer 
pressure. If the Commonwealth had not been able to improve economic and political 
governance  among  its  members,  why  would  this  happen  in  the  CPLP  group,  whose 
Business Council was not even in operation yet? The fact that CPLP is much closer to 
South-South co-operation than the Commonwealth goes in the same direction, but after 
several years, CPLP and the Macao Forum have not managed to become complementary.  
 
                                                 
27 The subsequent incorporation of NEPAD in the AU and the creation of the African Partnership Forum 
diluted this emerging partnership. Nevertheless, the OECD Development Center was reinforced after the 
entry of three other African countries (Egypt, Mauritius and Morocco). 
28 . This will be preceded by a gathering of representatives of 36 universities and institutes in 19 European 
countries who founded an association and a European economic interest grouping whose name changed 
from  ECART  to  AGRINATURA.  Recent  publications  on  development  successes  in  agriculture  are 
Spielman and Pandya-Lorch (2009) and Braun et al (2009). 28 
The Ministers of Science, Technology and Higher Education of CPLP gathered in Lisbon 
on 29 August 2009 called for common sets of indicators in their fields, along the lines of 
the  declaration  approved  the  year  before  -  which  recognizes  that  academics,  policy 
makers, the business community and civil society face the common challenge of learning, 
through  joint  endeavors,  to  use  scientific  knowledge  for  sustainable  development  to 
improve  human  well-being,  based  on  effective  governance  for  inclusive  economic 
globalization. It maintains that governance responses to globalization are more likely to 
promote sustained development if they are rooted in local cultures and that shared values 
are critical for fostering cooperation based on trust and mutual accountability. Coming 
back to initiatives of culture based multilateralism, the Lisbon declaration on science and 
technology for global development of 30 September, 2008 was approved at the workshop 
on Committing Science to Global Development convened on behalf of the CGIAR, the 
United Nations University and research institutions in CPLP
29.  
 
4. REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND FLEXIBLE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
4.1. The exchange rate regime, fiscal rules and policy guidelines 
Regional governance is most advanced in Europe and includes various layers (eurozone, 
EU, candidates and neighbours in South and East, ACP partners). The commitment at the 
European Council of Spring 2000 of making Europe “the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based  economy  in  the  world”  by  2010  extended  from  EU15  to  27,  even 
though structural indicators benchmarks included in the so-called Lisbon agenda were 
rebased at mid-term. At the request of the European Council of Spring 2004, reviewed in 
Spring  2005,  the  Kok  report  addressed  the  question  of  how  to  face  the  challenge  of 
combining  growth  and  employment  in  an  enlarged  union  facing  a  competitive  North 
America and Asia
30.  
As slippage in implementation continued the Lisbon agenda was formally abandoned by 
the first Barroso Commission and renamed 2020 by the second, after the entry into force 
of the so called Lisbon treaty. The painful process leading to institutional reform in 2009 
lasted a whole decade including a convention on the future of Europe and the complex 
Constitutional  treaty  it  approved  which  does  not  meet  simple  tests  for  separation  of 
powers, as illustrated  e.g. in The Federalist papers, and was  rejected  by voters even 
though it remains close to the Lisbon treaty which became effective on 1 December, 
2009. The treaty contains a useful flexibility clause, which should promote governance 
innovation but has not managed to avoid the  current sovereign debt turmoil in some 
eurozone countries. 
The choice of the exchange rate regime has a regional dimension. Regional integration 
reinforces  peer  alignment,  contributing  to  the  atmosphere  in  which  peer  review  and 
surveillance take place. The EU and Euro area policy review processes are very intensive, 
                                                 
29The workshop followed the ECART general assembly under IICT presidency and preceded the 15th 
meeting  of  the  Executive  Council  of  CGIAR  held  at  IICT.  This  multistakeholder  declaration  was 
“leveraged”  at  a  meeting  convened  by  CPLP,  IICT  and  the  Ministry  of  Science  and  Technology  of 
Mozambique, held at the margin of the CGIAR general assembly on 30 November. The declaration is 
available at http://www.mctes.pt/archive/doc/resolution.pdf 
30 European Council (2004). Recall the three quarters of world GDP accounted for by US, NA and EA in 
table 1 above. 29 
with peer pressure based on elements that cannot be replicated in any looser form of 
international institution. There are elaborate, frequent procedures sometimes based on 
rules,  but  mostly  on  national  commitments  to  which  it  is  the  task  of  the  monitoring 
agencies such as the European Commission, to keep countries to. The involvement of 
high-level  officials  is  much  greater  than  at  the  IMF  or  the  OECD,  so  that  the 
arrangements in place within the EU give by far the greatest scope for the exercise of 
peer pressure and supervision.  
 
Currency crashes underscore the evidence that the combination of pegged exchange rates 
and  open  capital  accounts  are  prone  to  costly  accidents.  In  the  1990s,  soft  pegs  and 
narrow  bands  (2.25%  in  the  European  Monetary  System)  created  a  one-way  bet  for 
speculators, as convergence plays in connection with the EU southern enlargement were 
encouraged by pegs that assumedly minimized currency risk and thereby created investor 
moral hazard. The widening of the bands was thus a necessary step towards monetary 
unification. Mexico’s 1994-95 highlighted the same crisis mechanism as slow disinflation 
in the presence of heavy intramarginal intervention to defend the crawling peg for the 
peso had created cumulative competitiveness problems and a large current account deficit 
financed by short-term bonds.  
 
The initial gains in credibility brought about by hard pegs are often ephemeral, and the 
same  is  true  of  lower  capital  cost.  Both  francophone  Africa  and  Argentina  became 
trapped by an inappropriate anchor currency - inappropriate as the anchor did neither 
reflect their trade directions nor their cyclical needs. Thus the Franc zone peg amplified 
good  and  bad  times  while  in  Argentina  a  monetary  panacea  turned  into  fiscal 
straightjacket with high liquidity requirements. Intermediate regimes can stabilise real 
effective  exchange  rates  of  developing  country  groups  but  peg  to  single  currency  is 
exceptional. As there are few currencies available to borrow credibility from, to earn 
credibility demands a process of institutional development and economic flexibility rather 
than importing it through a hard peg and forgetting about domestic reforms. Both pure 
floating and hard pegs make future regional cooperation more difficult. This is important 
in a world of regional trade blocs which look for ways to intensify cooperation. A float is 
an inherently unstable regime for countries competing on world markets for a similar 
range  of  products  and  hence  sets  incentives  for  beggar-thy-neighbour  competitive 
devaluation. Floating induces non-cooperative strategies, especially when the competing 
neighbours face a common shock. Hard pegs are hard because it is so difficult to reverse 
them and because they lack an exit strategy. They are thus only suited for countries which 
aim at joining a monetary union with the anchor currency in not too distant a future. Once 
again, the perspective of joining or creating a monetary union can make intermediate 
regimes  more  robust  in  the  mean  time.  The  complexity  of  basket  pegs  with  bands 
hampers  their  verifiability,  but  is  nevertheless  needed  for  credibility.  Once  the 
effectiveness  of  the  multilateral  surveillance  framework  is  verifiable,  there  should  be 
greater tolerance for intermediate regimes. As a consequence, the argument that they are 
"too complicated for locals and for Wall Street" need not apply.  
 
The way in which geographical peripheries can acquire global reputation is by setting up 
a  multilateral  surveillance  framework,  which  is  necessarily  a  group  arrangement  to 30 
overcome  the  cost  of  physical  distance  through  financial  proximity.  Doctrinal 
controversies often reflect different assumptions about the relative importance of initial 
conditions,  terminal  conditions  and  the  speed  of  adjustment  also  called  capacity  to 
transform
31. In developing economies, though, the institutional framework for such an 
orientation is lacking, so that the rules for monetary stability are not credible. Moreover 
credible surveillance is needed for geographical peripheries to acquire global reputation. 
The time it takes for a nation to acquire a reputation for financial probity varies but it 
typically  involves  several  general  elections  where  alternative  views  of  society  may 
confront each other. To construct a social consensus domestically, credible signals that 
the authorities are committed to reform may be needed. If stable democratic governments 
succeed in implementing reforms which help to achieve convergence between poorer and 
richer nations and regions, they can set off a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle of stability 
and growth. On the other hand, there will be a vicious cycle if short-lived governments, 
fearing the social  conflicts associated with reforms, delay implementation and impair 
convergence.  
 
Multilateral  surveillance  helped  former  EU  peripheries  earn  credibility  through  the 
operation of a code of conduct built up over the years, which transformed the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism from an exchange rate arrangement into a convergence instrument. This 
code of conduct favoured a medium term orientation of macroeconomic policy, coupled 
with measures designed to improve the functioning of factor markets and of the public 
sector. Actually, “sustained regime change” was identified as a condition for benefits to 
accrue to peripheral nations or regions. This argument was especially strong under the 
limited  labour  mobility  and  flexibility,  coupled  with  low  fiscal  redistribution  among 
states, which prevails in the European economy. In these circumstances, exchange rate 
adjustments may become necessary to eliminate declines in competitiveness but they may 
not succeed in changing relative prices. The greater the underlying capital mobility and 
the  more  likely  the  repetition  of  exchange  rate  adjustments,  the  less  effective  a 
devaluation will be. This is consistent with survey data suggesting that firms did not 
expect devaluation to solve their problems but rather thought that credit constraints were 
a more severe hindrance to expansion at the peripheries than at the centre.  
 
With high capital mobility, exchange rate stability requires a speedy real and nominal 
convergence  process.  The  indicators  of  budgetary  discipline  have  become  signals  of 
regime change sustained by the structural reform of the public sector. It is well known 
that financial markets tend to exaggerate rather than to dampen such signals, apparent 
reversions during a relatively rapid convergence are also more liable to misinterpretation. 
The cohesion objective involves a degree of social awareness that may not be required 
with respect to the convergence of fiscal variables. In any event, whatever the credibility 
of  national  policies,  it  was  apparent  even  before  2008  that  fast  convergence  is  more 
                                                 
31 The term is from Kindleberger’s classic (1962). On initial and terminal conditions, Krugman (1991) 
showed that there are conditions under which the latter rather than the former are the key determinant of 
choice of equilibrium. The three environments in  which  an expectations-driven equilibrium exists boil 
down to a comparison between the rate of interest and increasing returns relative to adjustment costs, 
whereby faster economic adjustment helps prevent policy reversals for any given level of interdependence 
in time (discount rate) and in space (externalities).  31 
difficult with slower growth and that the main macroeconomic costs arise before the main 
microeconomic benefits are felt.  
 
If, in the final analysis, the exchange rate reflects the credibility of national policies over 
the medium term, it may do so with considerable noise if the entire parity grid is under 
attack.  This  is  why  little  indication  about  the  credibility  of  national  policy  could  be 
gathered  from  the  realignments  which  occurred  during  the  turbulent  1992-93  period. 
Speculative attacks on more vulnerable currency parities have more negative effects on 
the system if parities are already locked than if they continue to be flexible. Flexibility 
within a sufficiently wide band allows speculation not to be a one-way bet. When very 
wide  bands  of  15%  replaced  the  normal  fluctuation  margins,  the  external  discipline 
provided by the grid no longer obtained and each central bank could decide whether or 
not to intervene within the old fluctuation bands. Most decided to do just that, so that the 
convergence process was not hurt by the decision to widen the band. The lesson from the 
currency crises is that the largely unwritten code of conduct implied more effective co-
ordination  mechanisms  among  monetary  and  fiscal  authorities  than  expected.  Non-
compliance  with  the  code  of  conduct  played  a  major  role  in  the  development  of  the 
currency turmoil, but the system regained stability after the widening of the fluctuation 
bands, which limited speculative pressure by eliminating one-way bets and reintroducing 
two-way risks. 
 
The  set  of  principles,  rules  and  code  of  conduct  which  underlie  the  parity  grid  have 
proven correct for the single currency, so that the widening of the bands was a positive 
step towards the euro. When the decision to widen the bands was taken, however, many 
observers and prominent economists stated that the euro was dead, but the opposite was 
more likely. The best indicator of policy credibility is that multilateral surveillance is 
effective. It is the multilateral surveillance framework that determines the choice of an 
exchange rate regime.  
 
In the run-up to the euro, there was a fear that restrictions on fiscal policy called for by 
the excessive deficit procedure contained in the Maastricht treaty and by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) would hurt growth and prosperity. Nevertheless, it has been shown 
that the retroactive application of the SGP would not have exacerbated recessions over 
the 1961-97 period. The first suspension, decided on November 2003 by the EU Council 
of Ministers, followed numerous prior suggestions that it should be scrapped, or amended 
to make it more effective, especially for large countries, whose deficits most threaten the 
stability of the eurozone. However, Buti, Eiffinger and Franco (2003) show that, against 
established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, the design and compliance mechanisms fare 
reasonably  well.  Its  weaknesses  tend  to  reflect  trade-offs  typical  of  supranational 
arrangements
32. With the crisis, moreover, the timing of exit strategies from the stimulus 
                                                 
32 The first suspension of the SGP illustrated the problem in the EU, but it is of course a danger for any 
international organization, as some countries have a much larger weight than others. Discussion on the 
possible  breakup  of  the  eurosystem  carry  the  same  message  (Eurointelligence  2009)  and  has  been 
exacerbated by the crisis in public finance in some of the member countries, notably Greece. This has been 
in part the consequence of the misreporting of data to Eurostat, in violation of a centralization principle 
included in the Maastricht treaty. 32 
packages has been constrained by suspicions about the ability of governments to repay 
their mounting public debts. This has been  a  greater problem  for  advanced countries 
because their public debts are larger. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), when 
public  debt  reaches  90%  of  GDP,  growth  is  impaired.  In  the  eurozone,  there  is  the 
additional problem of graduating countries such as Portugal or Greece (see table 4 above) 
whose  financial  reputation  may  not  be  established  enough  to  avoid  negative 
consequences of rumors of possible default (Krugman 2010).  
 
While the suspension to avoid possible penalties makes future fiscal rules less credible, 
there  is  consensus  on  the  need  for  such  rules  to  enforce  the  Treaty’s  “no  bail-out” 
provision. In fact, evidence from the markets suggests that the SGP has not hurt Euro 
credibility. Persaud and Metcalfe (2002) analyse the impact of over 400 news stories 
about breaches of the SGP on several measures of market credibility (changes in real 
yields, changes in real yield spreads to the US, changes in the yield curve, changes in the 
euro  trade  weighted  exchange  rate,  positive  correlation  between  eurozone  equity  and 
bond prices) and find that there is no effect. A finer analysis, reflecting the contents of the 
stories, allows them to conclude that the SGP alleviated concerns about "the free rider 
problem that potentially arises with the adoption of a common currency across a group of 
states with national budgets”. They suggest that “an amendment that increased policy 




If,  under  the  current  degree  of  EU  fiscal  integration,  correcting  excessive  deficits  is 
difficult  for  member  countries,  buttressing  the  soundness  of  public  finances  is  a 
formidable  task  in  countries  with  histories  of  high  inflation,  where  neither  the  social 
partners nor public employees automatically appreciate the benefits of the regime change 
that the policymakers are attempting to engineer. Errors in policy appraisal can unduly 
raise the costs of reform, when information about the change in regime is not readily 
available  to  international  financial  markets.  Repeated  market  tests  of  the  authorities' 
commitment to exchange rate stability may result from this imperfect  information.  If 
these tests of the authorities' resolve greatly increase the cost of defending the exchange 
rate, they can lead to policy reversals. Conversely, if the volatility of the exchange rate is 
a direct consequence of system turbulence, market tests will be short-lived and the threat 
of a reversal will become less and less credible, both abroad and at home. 
 
The  Euro  delivered  convergence  and  cohesion  in  its  first  ten  years  because  the  new 
politics of credibility overcame financial hierarchy among sovereign risks. Trade unions 
recognised the perverse interaction between price and wage increases (which hurts the 
poor and unemployed disproportionately) and public opinion accepted the medium term 
stance of policy. Yet it took longer to convince voters than markets, and some countries 
used the Euro to procrastinate on their unpopular reforms, threatening the benefits of the 
stability culture with the “Euro hold up” (Buiter and Sibert 1997; Macedo et al 2001). 
                                                 
33  According  to  Buti,  Eiffinger  and  Franco  (2003),  “redefining  the  medium  term  budgetary  target, 
improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan 
application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and 
higher flexibility”. 33 
While this tendency to procrastinate casts doubt on the efficacy of the European financial 
architecture perspective, more flexible integration schemes may lead initially reluctant 
states to join in and increase the reform momentum.  
 
4. 2. Flexible integration in the EU 
Since its meeting in Brussels in late 1993, the European Council has been issuing Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines against which policy and performance in the member states 
are  to  be  gauged  in  what  has  become  a  regular  test  of  the  multilateral  surveillance 
framework  for  all  EU  member  states.  The  progress  of  policy  reform  stands  on  how 
effective this framework might be among union officials whose interaction with national 
officials  should  be  accountable  in  their  respective  parliaments  and  in  the  European 
parliament. This has been a dynamic process moving EU member countries’ national 
policies  towards  integration  leading  to  binding  recommendations  and  sanctions.  Until 
2008, the EU used different surveillance processes for different policy areas and this 
surveillance  instrument  set  out  the  general  directions  that  economic  policies  should 
follow. The guidelines became a very detailed policy co-ordination instrument, including 
recommendations for structural policies, even though there was no way to ensure the 
coherence between among the different surveillance processes (SGP, Luxemburg process 
for social issues, Lisbon strategy, etc). This is why the Integrated Guidelines, adopted in 
Spring 2005, lay out a comprehensive strategy of macroeconomic, microeconomic and 
employment policies to redress Europe’s weak growth performance and insufficient job 
creation,  bringing  together  for  the  first  time  various  guidelines  in  one  single, 
comprehensive document. According to the European Commission website, this helped 
create more than 18m new jobs before the financial and economic crisis hit. When the 
economy slumped, the EU acted to stabilize the financial system and adopted a recovery 
plan  to  boost  demand  and  restore  confidence.  The  plan  is  delivering  a  major  fiscal 
stimulus, with measures to keep people in work and public investment in infrastructure, 
innovation, new skills for the workforce, energy  efficiency and  clean technologies to 
meet the goals of the Lisbon strategy. A new strategy dubbed EU 2020 strategy should 
enable  the  EU  to  make  a  full  recovery  from  the  crisis,  and  help  speed  up  the  move 
towards  a  greener,  more  sustainable,  and  more  innovative  economy  (European 
Commission 2009).  
 
These strategies can be expressed as CI(SR)
2  <= CM+OMC. In European jargon, this is 
a Comprehensive, Interdependent and Self Reinforcing Series of Reforms brought about 
by Community Method and Open Method of Coordination. In fact, more than a hundred 
indicators were associated with the Lisbon process, making this instrument ineffective for 
the Heads of State or Government and the wider public annual. Kok´s suggestion was 
that the Commission should present updates on the key 14 Lisbon indicators in the format 
of league tables with rankings (1 to 25), praising good performance and castigating bad 
performance  —  naming,  shaming  and  faming.  This  “name  &  shame  through  league 
table”  was  accepted  with  the  exception  of  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government,  who 
appoint a special representative (known as Mr or Ms Lisbon) to induce peer pressure and 
benchmarking and to facilitate exchange of best practice, making better use of the 14 
indicators  and  better  communicating  the  results  in  order  to  ratchet  up  the  political 
consequences of non-delivery. The details of the structural indicators and targets are of 34 
interest because they show the interplay between structural and macroeconomic policy 
coordination. Five areas of policy were identified: the knowledge society, the internal 
market, the business climate, the labor market and environmental sustainability. On the 
knowledge society, the objective is to increase Europe’s attractiveness for researchers and 
scientists,  make  Research  &  Development  a  top  priority  and  promote  the  use  of 
information  and  communication  technologies.  On  the  internal  market,  complete  the 
internal market for the free movement of goods and capital, urgent action to create a 
single market for services, improve the business climate, reduce the total administrative 
burden, improve the quality of legislation, facilitate the rapid start-up of new enterprises 
and create an environment more supportive to businesses. On the labor market, rapid 
delivery  on  the  recommendations  of  the  European  Employment  Taskforce,  develop 
strategies for lifelong leaning and active ageing, underpin partnerships for growth and 
employment,  promote  environmental  sustainability,  spread  eco-innovations  and  build 
leadership  in  eco-industry  and  pursue  policies  which  lead  to  long-term  and  sustained 
improvements in productivity through eco-efficiency.  
 
These objectives remain relevant to the EU 2020 strategy currently being considered, 
described as  “an inclusive, smarter,  greener economy”, which  “will require increased 
policy  co-ordination,  better  synergies  through  effective  subsidiarity,  and  strengthened 
partnership between the EU and Member States in the design  and delivery of public 
policies. The integration of different policy instruments is necessary, linking institutional 
reforms, better regulation, new initiatives and public investment”. These are the single 
market, to be fully exploited, supporting growth through full use of the SGP, reflecting 
political priorities in the Community budget, and establishing clear governance to make 
the new strategy effective. Drawing on the new provisions of the  Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Council should steer the strategy but the “Commission would like to see the 
European Parliament play a significantly greater role in the new governance structure. 
Beyond  its  traditional  role  on  the  employment  and  integrated  guidelines,  Parliament 
could  be  encouraged  to  express  views  on  the  EU  2020  strategy  before  the  Spring 
European Council”. The Spring European Council in 2010 should set the strategy on its 
course for the next 5 years on the basis of a Commission proposal, fixing a small number 
of headline objectives, and defining the corresponding policy actions to be pursued at EU 
and  Member  State  level  in  partnership.  It  is  recognized  that,  in  order  to  reach  its 
objectives for 2020, the EU must act decisively in the G20 and international forums. 
 
In sum, the EU remains the most ambitious attempt to promote rules of good conduct 
among its members than the other international organizations. This is why the EU helps 
draw  lessons  for  other  countries  and  regions.  But  it  must  be  stressed  that  other 
international organizations also played a role in spreading the results of alternative policy 
paths among their member states. The wide acceptance observed suggests that national 
policymakers stabilized, liberalized and privatized the economy in part because they saw 
other policymakers do the same. EU processes derive from a comprehensive "rule book" 
and call for a greater involvement of many high-level national decision makers than at the 
other institutions. In this connection, the European institutional architecture is interpreted 
in  a  way  that  favours  schemas  of  flexible  integration,  which  have  a  voluntary,  self 
selection element. Similarly, the non-compulsory aspect of OECD enhances countries’ 35 
sense of ownership and makes an important contribution to this atmosphere (Macedo, 
2003).  This  is,  once  again,  why  in  the  EU  there  is  peer  pressure  on  the  basis  of 
commitments. 
 
Proximity suggests governance responses at the appropriate level, through the combined 
action of elected officials and civil society (including business). The common good may 
thus be provided by regional institutions, as long as the various levels of government are 
appropriately  combined.  For  these  reasons  schemas  of  flexible  integration  have  been 
proposed,  where  the  principle  of  proximity  (or  subsidiarity)  is  generalized  from 
geography to issue areas. This generalization depends on the characteristics of the public 
good being provided. When there are network externalities with exclusion benefits, as is 
the  case  with  the  Eurosystem  (also  Schengen),  then  such  flexible  integration  has  a 
snowballing effect, which may lead initially reluctant states to join in. When there are no 
exclusion benefits but rather free ride problems, flexible integration does not lead initially 
reluctant states to join in. This has been observed with respect to common resources (tax 
or otherwise). Whether policies can have a snowballing effect or not depends, then, on 
the design of the access to common resources. If the taxation element is restricted in 
areas, such as in social security reform, it may be easier to spread best practices than if 
there is an attempt at harmonising systems. Similarly, the financing of public services 
may be designed to avoid taxation insofar as possible, so that for certain public goods, 
national  legitimacy  and  democratic  accountability  at  national  level  may  be  allowed 
(Kolliker, 2001).  
 
The recurrent European debate about whether multiple-speed convergence towards union 
objectives is possible and desirable illustrates the complementarities between global and 
regional common good. One extreme position in the European debate draws on the view 
of a unified constitutional state, for which variable geometry is impossible. The other 
extreme position calls for a set of contractual arrangements, where common institutions 
are undesirable. From the beginning, the European Community attempted to transcend 
the  rigid  intergovernmental  nature  of  the  OECD  or  of  the  G7  in  the  direction  of 
supranational institutions like the Commission. But the convergence stopped far short of 
establishing Community-wide democratic legitimacy. As a consequence, the institutional 
framework became more and more complex, especially after a Union with three pillars 
was created in 1992. In the process, flexibility was lost and this is why the draft European 
constitution approved in 2003 by the Convention for the future of Europe abolished the 
three pillars and favored schemes of reinforced co-operation, which are still present in the 
treaty approved in Lisbon at the end of 2007 (which only went into force two years later). 
 
The case for flexible integration can be made by contrasting depth of integration with 
flexibility.  For  any  given  number  of  member  states,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  the 
freedom to enter into contractual agreements which include some members and exclude 
others and the ultimate requirement of "one man, one vote" which would be associated 
with a new state emerging from the integration of all members. The two dimensions of 
the trade-off are economic efficiency and executive performance, on the one hand, and 
legal status and legislative activity, on the other. An alternative way of expressing the 
trade-off  which  comes  closer  to  the  “together  alone  paradox”  refers  to  forces  of 36 
competition  and  the  forces  of  co-operation.  Zero  integration  and  zero  flexibility 
represents purely intergovernmental co-operation among the same member states, and 
from there any combination between competition and co-operation can be represented as 
in Figure 5, adapted from CEPR (1996). 
 
Figure 5 here  
 
Then Europe "a la carte" would be equivalent to a purely contractual institutional design 
where any combination of subgroups of member states is acceptable, so that the basic 
intergovernmental  principle  of  equality  of  member  states  applies  and  unanimity  in 
decision making is preserved. During the revisions for the Amsterdam (1996) and Nice 
(2000) treaties, intergovernmental schemes of reinforced co-operation have been called 
for among some member states, as their creation still requires unanimity of all member 
states and their membership is open to all of the member states who qualify. Flexible 
integration has been the exception rather than rule, however, and no mechanisms for 
reinforced cooperation were initiated under the Nice treaty, which made them possible in 
Community, Justice and Home Affairs and even some areas of Common Foreign and 
Security  Policy  (CEPR  2001).  The  institutionalization  of  the  eurogroup  of  finance 
ministers in the Lisbon treaty rotates the line of reinforced cooperation in Figure 5. As 
discussed below, the market turmoil in 2008 and 2009 moved the SGP down towards the 
“superstate”  point,  creating  an  institutional  dilemma  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Lisbon treaty. The “together alone” paradox manifests itself even at a very high level of 
integration, as mentioned at the outset. 
 
To  the  extent  that  flexible  integration  also  stresses  the  portability  of  the  European 
experience to countries in different stages of economic and financial development, it may 
not only facilitate enlargement but also a clearer European identity in development co-
operation.  Greater  North-South-South  partnership,  as  envisaged  by  the  AAA  and 
mentioned in section 3.4, may also be easier with the development architecture brought 
about by the Lisbon treaty. 
 
The failure of the fiscal rules included in the SGP impacted on the characteristics of the 
public  good  provided  by  the  Eurosystem,  as  vigorously  argued  by  the  European 
Commission  and  Central  Bank.  In  addition,  since  the  Maastricht  treaty,  the  one  area 
where subsidiarity does not apply is the compilation of data – it had been recognised that 
unless there was agreement on the facts under consideration it would not be possible to 
move discussion on to the next stage. The widespread use of financial instruments has 
nevertheless allowed some countries to circumvent the centralization of budget and debt 
information  to  the  Eurostat,  making  collaboration  with  other  specialized  institutions, 
notably the IMF, more necessary than it would otherwise be.   
 
The increasing attention of investors to specificities within the eurozone goes beyond the 
backlash  from  loose  financial  regulation  which  was  common  to  the  EU  and  most  of 
OECD countries. Nevertheless it came as a surprise after some ten years during which 
sovereign debt instruments of eurozone countries were seen as close substitutes in terms 
of risk, and the spreads relative to the German Bund were minimal. The effect of the 37 
Lehmann Brothers failure and the recent volatility are evident in government bond yield 
spreads as well as credit default swaps, a related market which has grown substantially 
over the last years
  34. In Figure 6, spreads in 5 year contracts relative to Germany for 
Greece, Portugal and Spain show Portugal as being closer to Spain than to Greece but 
nevertheless higher, even though it has a better unemployment outlook. The budgetary 
situation explains this ranking, which is also found in bank CDS premia
35 . 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
In addition to peer review by commitment, then, perceptions of creditworthiness have 
become as relevant to regional convergence in the eurozone as economic and financial 
fundamentals: while Portugal has a better budgetary situation than Greece and a better 
unemployment  outlook  than  Spain,  its  fundamentals  appear  worse.  This  may  be  a 
communication problem, pertaining to hesitations about the SGP but, as Garicano (2010) 
claims, the crucial dimension is the ability to continue structural reforms so as to restore 
growth and competitiveness. 
 
4. 3. OECD “surveillance” of non-members and the G20 
Each surveillance framework serves a particular purpose: the ownership by the country is 
least in the IMF, whereas the EU is most predicated on the common goal of integration 
(Thygesen 2002, adapted in annex). The mutual surveillance by OECD has the greatest 
diversity,  from  overall  economic  policy  to  structural  and  sectoral  issues  in  health, 
education, corporate governance etc. Aid policies, like most other non-defence policies of 
member countries, have been subject to peer reviews. Different mechanisms apply to 
different objectives and to the different mandates of the respective committees which in 
turn  relate to the degrees of commitment from soft co-ordination to mutual help (OECD 
2002). The initial collaboration with NEPAD built on considerable work carried out with 
major emerging markets. Among major non-member countries which have embarked in 
reform processes, Russia, a G-8 member, was the first to be examined in 1995, and this 
peer review has taken place several times since. The Economic Survey of 2001 was 
quite influential in Brazil. It had found the previous review exercise a very interesting 
and  useful  experience,  in  particular  in  that  it  had  extended  the  capacity  of  local 
institutions to collect the relevant data.  
 
Conversely, in its initial approach to China, OECD mentioned surveillance and got a 
rather cold reception. A fluctuating relationship ensued, which presents lessons for the 
way in which international organizations approach countries with the view to offering 
them assistance. Following a number of years of developing contacts with officials and 
                                                 
34 The implicit arbitrage suggested by a comparison of the two instruments has been demonstrated in the 
corporate finance literature (e.g. Duffee, 1999 and Hull et al. 2004). I am indebted to my colleague Miguel 
Ferreira for these references. An alternative explored by Kamin and Pounder (2010) are 5 year CDS premia 
on financial firms averaged for each country weighted by the firms’s total assets.  
35 Kamin and Pounder (2010) report premia for 19 industrial economies, which are both very low and 
tightly clustered prior to August 2007, progressively rise and become  less  well clustered, even so the 
spreads exhibit considerable co-movement as do the stock prices for financial firms. From June 2007 until 
September 2008, the largest increases in the eurozone were for Ireland, Greece, Austria and Netherlands 
(about 200), followed by Spain and France (150), Belgium, Portugal and Italy (100). 38 
institutes,  relations  improved  considerably,  to  the  extent  that  China  became  an 
outstanding  example  of  a  country  that  knows  how  to  benefit  from  the  work  of 
international bodies. It is keener on the concept of peer example than peer pressure and is 
constantly looking for analyses and information. The decisions taken by the authorities 
are well-informed by conclusions reached on other countries’ success and failures (this is 
borne out, for example, in their caution with regard to capital account and banking sector 
liberalisation). This shows that the benefits of surveillance and peer review exercises go 
far beyond the impact of an individual report such as that of 2002. This broader impact, 
not just for China but for other countries which are considering reforming or rethinking 
their  policies,  should  not  be  underestimated.  Another  contribution,  coming  from  the 
Statistics Directorate, has been the construction of a cyclical indicator for China, which 
has allowed a better monitoring of the economy’s short term performance.   
 
The peer review process is also a cultural phenomenon -- the regular participation in the 
peer review process leads to the development of a new frame of mind. This then raises 
the question of whether local knowledge and local capacity are adequate to challenge the 
message from the peer review process when it is incorrect, and the collective wisdom is 
not wisdom at all. There the only guarantee is the quality of the analysis, which is also 
crucial to the credibility of the international organisations responsible for surveillance; 
everything should be done to ensure the production of the best possible quality of work. It 
is  also  important  to  remain  open  to  new  academic  ideas  and  not  to  bend  with  the 
prevailing view of governments.  
 
Peer pressure may hurt good governance when indicators are not supported by data and 
analytical knowledge on the issues. The importance of comparable data is crucial to peer 
pressure.  Otherwise  wrong  conclusions  could  be  reached.  This  is  why  the  IMF  has 
provided information to feed peer pressure in a regional context such as that which has 
taken place among finance ministers from Latin America, the Association of South East 
Asian Nations or the Chang-Mei initiative. The same has happened in the context of the 
Euro Area’s monitoring framework as well as that of the EU as a whole, even before the 
Lisbon treaty recognized the institutional existence of the Eurogroup.  
 
While multilateral surveillance frameworks apply mostly to macroeconomic issues, there 
are  several  cases  of  peer  pressure  on  structural  policies.  The  efforts  involving  food 
security have been especially visible because they preceded the global financial and have 
been often focused on technical and political rather than economic aspects. Indeed, the 
lack  of  agricultural  research  for  development  has  already  threatened  agricultural 
productivity in developing countries after the food and energy crises of the 1970s. Lower 
productivity and neglect of agriculture exacerbated food price volatility and the energy 
crisis, leading on to the near financial meltdown of September 2008. The economic crisis 
was a common threat. Yet no one saw it coming in developed countries and no one knew 
how to deal with its global nature when it struck. The developing world saw the food and 
energy  crises  coming  in  2007  but  couldn’t  believe  it  would  spread  to  credit  because 
bankers, regulators and politicians in advanced countries were supposed to know what 
they were doing. Once again, the Monterrey Consensus on the MDGs reflected the first 
time international organizations developed an agenda together, but it largely left out the 39 
specialized agencies of the UN system. Moreover, as discussed above, the consensus was 
not implemented and there has been no momentum for global change. The same cannot 
be said of specific areas, including agricultural and space research, where experiences 
with culture-based multilateralism were noted at the end of the previous section. 
 
The  G20  inherits  the  flexible  structure  of  the G7  (which  does  not  have  a  permanent 
secretariat) but has a renewed mandate for the IMF and, according to the Europe 20202 
agenda will receive a greater commitment from European institutions, possibly a single 
seat for the eurozone. The review of “how national and regional policy frameworks fit 
together” called for in the Pittsburgh communiqué (Framework for Strong, Sustainable, 
and Balanced Growth #5) may well not survive the exit strategies being considered by 
G20 members – especially if the “group think” of the various institutions involved in 
multilateral surveillance does not abate. On the other hand, if the various peer review 
mechanisms become complements rather than substitutes, the new mandate may  deepen 
and  widen  IMF  peer  review  of  its  G20  members,  something  the  IMF  has  not  been 




The  text  claims  that,  given  state  capacity  and  the  absence  of  conflict,  developing 
countries and emerging markets can benefit from multilateral surveillance of the kind 
often associated with OECD and EU. In other words, global governance needs criteria for 
the system efficient procedures along the lines of what Robert Triffin proposed for the 
reform of Bretton-Woods since the 1950s when he was involved with European monetary 
cooperation  (Eichengreen  and  Macedo  2001).  Recent  examples  of  this  positive  G&G 
interaction emphasized by Contzen (2009) are the opportunities for developing countries 
of  the  stimulus  packages  of  developed  countries,  especially  through  knowledge 
innovations in the energy and environmental fields. 
 
That being said, the global crisis revealed a “together alone” rooted in “group think” 
within and between countries. In spite of peer review mechanisms at the OECD and the 
EU,  and  of  international  governance  innovation  such  as  the  “global  partnership  for 
development”, not enough attention had been paid to common problems among advanced 
countries, including financial regulation and supervision in the face of rising asset prices. 
Increased trade in goods, services and assets led to rising global imbalances between the 
US and emerging markets with currencies pegged to the dollar, especially China. The 
resulting  volatility  in  prices  of  oil  and  staples  had  severe  implications  for  poverty 
alleviation and food security, making the MDGs impossible to reach in 2015, especially 
in the AU, where a peer review mechanism has been operating for almost ten years.  
 
The  paradox,  illustrated  by  the  letters  of  the  British  Academy  to  the  Queen  and  the 
description of the crisis as Western (“blue eyed” for the President of Brazil, brings out 
into a renewed interest  in methodology which  goes beyond calls for interdisciplinary 
research - as long as this research does not disturb the usual “economists tribes”, a point 
that  comes  across  more  clearly  in  the  second  letter.  A  perspective  based  on  G&G 
interaction to the “together alone” paradox introduces mutual knowledge as essential for 40 
the global partnership on development and presents in that connection the experience of 
culture-based multilateralism among members of the CPLP. The focus on Europe as an 
example of regional governance where peer pressure stems from explicit commitments is 
embedded in a comparison of multilateral surveillance frameworks in IMF, OECD, EU 
and AU (Macedo, 2003). The claim is that this may promote the common good, if it also 
fosters  governance  innovation  –  which  in  turn  requires  a  combination  of  greater 
integration and flexibility. In the OECD case, applications of multilateral surveillance 
beyond members reinforce the claim. While the G20 process is a combination of the 
various forms of peer pressure, it may enhance the multilateral surveillance framework of 
the  IMF  in  the  direction  of  mutual  accountability.  The  annex  builds  on  a  survey  by 
Thygesen  (2002)  to  compare  multilateral  surveillance  frameworks.  Together  with  the 
current  instability  in  the  eurozone  stressed  in  section  4,  it  still  appears  that  such 
frameworks are the most likely to bring about international governance innovation. 
 
The  “together  alone”  paradox  goes  towards  the  never  again  issue  addressed  by  the 
second  letter  of  the  British  Academy.  An  agenda  to  involve  more  economic  and 
interdisciplinary  work  in  public  debate  should  be  adopted  by  other  academies  and 
research universities. A letter avoiding “group think” of advanced (blue-eyed?) countries 
might  result  from  a  debate  encompassing  humanities  and  social  sciences  as  well  as 




ANNEX MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE FRAMEWORKS COMPARED 
   
1. Origins of peer pressure at OECD 
 
The exchanges which take place in the various committees of OECD make the several 
thousand  national  civil  servants  who  each  year  attend  those  meetings  aware  of  the 
international  complexities  and  the  opportunities  for  improvement  that  exist.  These 
exchanges create a sense of community and thereby confidence in the review process. 
The existence of a community of policy practitioners allows them to bring their local 
knowledge to bear on the policy review process while also contributing to developing 
further  the  conceptual  knowledge  that  they  also  need.  This  contribution  to  meshing 
conceptual knowledge with local knowledge is key part of the OECD’s value-added. It 
has taken decades to mature and may be difficult to replicate. The Secretariat plays an 
                                                 
36 On the first anniversary of the Queen’s visit to LSE, the economics and finance section of ACL agreed to 
make this a preferred theme for discussion by gathering several recent contributions in addition to the 
ferragosto presentation mentioned in note 1 above: Nunes (forthcoming); Cardoso (2009), Andrade et al 
(2009), Cunha (2009). See also Mendes (2009) and Contzen (2010), who are part of the interdisciplinary 








important and particular role in OECD peer review exercises because of the quality and 
uncommon honesty of the background analyses, which are essential for undertaking the 
reviews. For this reason, it is important to safeguard the quality of those entities within 
the Secretariat, in particular those engaged in macroeconomic and structural analysis, 
which  are  responsible  for  the  peer  review  process.  Not  all  countries  participate  as 
examiners in each of the individual peer review exercises; this reinforces the importance 
of the Secretariat’s contribution and of its integrity. Moreover, the pressure exercised by 
the published report is much less than the peer pressure exerted in the course of the 
review process from the visits that the Secretariat pays to each country and, in particular, 
during the actual examination itself. If this is the case, then the content of the final report 
and what the  country accepts as  recommendations are less important than the advice 
given to policy makers in the course of the review exercise.  
 
On the other hand, IMF missions last at least two working weeks with more people than 
OECD. This is important, for the determinant of the standing of the institution is the 
quality of the staff’s work. In order to continue to perform well the OECD must maintain 
its  focus  on  a  small  number  of  key  structural  policy  areas  for  which  an  analytical 
framework can be developed. It must avoid being pushed gradually to purely sectoral 
issues such as energy liberalisation; under the impression that other institutions are doing 
enough on broad structural reforms and on their link to macroeconomic issues. Seeing 
OECD as a “reformers´ club” has implications for the convergence in economic policy 
cultures and even in most other areas of non-military policies (Macedo, 2003).  
 
There have been analogies of NEPAD with the Marshall Plan stressing the aid dimension. 
Yet the analogy is more helpful if the emphasis is on the peer pressure system set up to 
co-ordinate the implementation of the Marshall plan. Peer pressure encouraged a learning 
process among European nations, which was inherited by the OECD and the EU. As the 
choice  of  the  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime  illustrates,  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular countries and the topic under consideration matter a great deal for surveillance 
results: the absence of good data, for example, poses a considerable challenge to the 
exercise of surveillance and peer review, just like it would to any other initiative for 
better governance. Related to the need for adequate data and a well-defined analytical 
method, there is a cultural challenge for credible surveillance, which boils down to the 
effectiveness  of  peer  pressure.  Given  the  high  perception  of  political  risk  in  Africa 
relative to other developing areas, greater national capacity and institution building are 
necessary in order to make peer reviews useful for the purposes of better economic and 
political governance at the national, regional and global levels.  
 
The generalization of peer reviews seems contained in the G20 Pittsburgh communiqué 
(#5 how our national and regional policy frameworks fit together). Yet Africa’s exclusion 
from  global  governance  is  most  sensitive  when  the  global  crisis  is  deepening  and 
widening: successive meetings of G-20 exacerbate prior concerns about reaching MDGs. 
In spite of the presence of South Africa, this is a group where poor countries have no 
voice. Given what we said about the difficulties of going beyond members in OECD 
surveillance, this might put pressure on the AU Commission to step up the peer review 42 
mechanism  initiated  by  NEPAD.  The  issue  remains  of  why  potential  cooperative 
solutions are not applied domestically and internationally.  
 
2. Private macroeconomic surveillance and yardstick competition 
International organizations make projections and macroeconomic analysis, the work done 
by private sector analysts is of comparable quality and a lot of what they say is similar 
but it would be rendered much more difficult were the IMF and the OECD to cease 
producing projections. The effectiveness of the particular framework employed depends 
on the credibility of the review process. International organizations can add weight to 
local voices -- even if national think tanks have said something many times, it helps to 
have  a  credible  external  body  say  it  too.  Therefore,  international  organizations  must 
ensure that the analysis and advice presented to the countries is not, and is not perceived 
to be, either tainted by  special interests or weakened by the use of flawed analytical 
methods. Thus international organizations have a special role to play because of their 
comparative advantage and greater experience in some areas of evaluation, notably the 
international environment and interdependencies, and because they have easier access to 
data. In particular, aside from "bilateral" surveillance of individual member states, the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the OECD Economic Outlook put things into a 
global perspective, which clearly adds to the surveillance process. Under globalization, 
this  made  their  work  especially  credible  for  the  actors  involved.  With  the  crisis  this 
credibility has been lost, but the creation of the G20 has helped reinforce the role of IMF 
and OECD, to the extent that they are more confronted with the “together alone” paradox.  
 
The  benefits  of  information  sharing  are  evident  when  it  comes  to  the  prevention  of 
financial crises. Were it possible to predict crises, those avoided should be counted as 
successes. Looking at the phenomenon the other way, prediction is not sufficient when 
there is political sovereignty -- no matter how much pressure is exerted, that substantial 
degree of freedom cannot be broken. Perhaps the best gauge of success is the extent to 
which countries are better equipped to withstand crises and whether this is due in part to 
the existing surveillance mechanisms. This comes out of the debate on the choice of the 
exchange rate regime, especially in the verifiability of intermediate regimes. 
 
Banks and independent research institutes that evaluate policies and monitor economic 
performance and policies may fulfill most if not all surveillance functions. The private 
sector’s compliance and risk management expertise is particularly strong in making the 
case for financial liberalization. More generally, only local actors control the strategic 
resources – leadership and political capacity – that are essential for governing the policy 
process. These resources also include particular local knowledge of the nature (complicit 
or otherwise) of the relationship between the political and business communities, which 
can be acutely relevant to the policy process. The same can be said about national value 
systems and how these relate to various policy choices.  
 
The  importance  of  the  knowledge  bases  that  exist  in  the  countries  under  review, 
notwithstanding those available in international institutions, in particular certain types of 
technical or conceptual knowledge remain decisive for credible surveillance. In fact there 
is a tendency for local analysts to compare the prevailing situation with that of 10 or 15 43 
years earlier when the more relevant and more useful standard of comparison is often the 
experience of other countries. It is here that the comparative advantage of international 
institutions resides.  
 
Part of the soft co-ordination that takes place in international fora is information sharing 
(data  produced  on  a  comparable  method,  details  of  policies  in  various  sectors  and 
analysis  of  them).  Though  it  has  financial  costs,  this  public  good  element  is  not 
emphasized enough. This is the element that could most easily be transferred from the 
OECD  style  of  review  to  others.  Some  very  important  objectives  could  be  met  by 
improving  information  sharing,  especially  if  the  bigger  players’  understanding  of  the 
benefits of such information sharing improved.  
 
The  issue  of  whether  peer  pressure  bring  about  improved  performance  has  been 
addressed by Besley and Case (1995) in the context of yardstick competition, a term 
coming from industrial organization which suggests comparing similar regulated firms 
with  each  other  (Tirole,  1988).  For  any  given  firm,  the  regulator  uses  the  costs  of 
comparable  firms  to  infer  a  firm's  attainable  cost  level.  Conversely,  if  the  regulator 
equates the price to the marginal cost of the firm itself, then managers have no incentive 
to reduce cost. Using the costs of comparable firms (or their average excluding that of the 
firm itself, which serves like a fictitious "shadow firm") prevents the firm's choice to 
have an effect on the price it gets. As comparable firms may not exist or be observable, a 
scheme of yardstick competition may not fully overcome moral hazard problems, but it is 
certainly preferable to the traditional procedure of comparing current and future costs to 
past performance.  
 
The peer pressure scheme is thus susceptible to manipulation by participating firms but 
the difficulty in co-operating to impose collusive behavior makes this perverse outcome 
less likely. Note also that in the case where heterogeneity is observable and can therefore 
be corrected for, Schleifer (1985) shows that a regulatory scheme based on peer pressure 
should  lead  to  a  superior  performance.  This  implies  that  the  regulator  can  credibly 
threaten  to  make  inefficient  firms  lose  money  and  cost  reduction  can  therefore  be 
enforced.  When  national  objectives  are  at  stake,  best  practices  can  thus  be  achieved, 
rather than allowing a convergence towards the mean. Conversely, when peer pressure is 
used  to  stall  reforms,  rather  than  to  promote  them,  the  outcome  is  equivalent  to  the 
collusive equilibrium and an alternative yardstick must be devised.  
 
While the result depends on the specifics, it can be safely assumed that if the payoff to 
good behavior is less than the cost associated with it, there will not be benefits from 
competition and collusion will be more likely. Costs can come in various forms, from 
fines  to  exclusion.  As  global  finance  makes  benchmarking  unavoidable,  there  is 
consensus on the need for fiscal rules. As mentioned in the text, the suspension of the 
SGP in 2003 to avoid penalties for France and Germany during the Intergovernmental 
Conference on the failed draft constitution made agreement on a new set of rules more 
necessary but also more difficult. 
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The existence of yardstick competition among national policy makers is a consequence of 
the  lack  of  hierarchy  among  issues,  including  military  ones,  which  was  the  decisive 
element during the Cold War. Yardstick competition follows from the so-called complex 
interdependence among OECD countries (Keohane and Nye 1977), which implies that 
international issues are no longer subject to well defined hierarchies, as was assumed to 
be the case in the balance of power model of international relations, sometimes described 
as Westphalian. Moreover, the globalisation of business and the information revolution 
changed political processes in a way in which soft power became more important in 
relation  to  hard  power.  Credibility  became  a  key  power  resource,  giving  more  open, 
transparent organisations an advantage with respect to free information (Keohane and 
Nye, 2000).  
 
Under  complex  interdependence,  peer  pressure  did  not  apply  outside  the 
“reformers’club” and this reinforced the view of North vs. South, with the expectation 
that some form of development assistance would flow from rich to poor countries. Even 
after the end of the Cold War, the assumption was that there would be no interference in 
the domestic affairs of poor countries, even when political and economic governance 
were such that assistance benefited powerful groups and rarely reached the poor. This 
model  of  international  relations  remained  in  force  until  the  11  of  September  attacks. 
Since  then,  the  emphasis  on  security  has  brought  back  hierarchy,  even  among  like-
minded countries, but also the globalisation of solidarity. Legitimacy is certainly required 
but  multilateral  surveillance  frameworks  also  require  efficiency  and  this  can  only  be 
achieved through flexible schemas. National sovereignty has also remained at the heart of 
the UN system, and co-operation with IMF, World Bank or WTO has been limited to the 
Monterrey process.  Before the  global crisis, the role of peer pressure  expanded from 
OECD countries to AU but not to emerging markets like the BRICs. 
 
When there is peer pressure among national policymakers to follow best practices, these 
are likely to become more and more accepted. Peer reviews have enhanced competition 
for  better  macroeconomic  and  trade  policies.  Similar  benchmarking  has  begun  with 
respect to structural policies, especially those relating to the regulatory framework. The 
greater complexity of such policies makes them more susceptible to procrastination, and 
the same problem has been observed in the EU. This hinders institutional change and 
makes corporate and political governance more difficult. On the other hand, when applied 
to corporate strategy, yardstick competition leads to benchmarking exercises which have 
become common in intergovernmental cooperation.  
 
What is meant by pressure varies with the surveillance framework and the influence of 
advice  might  be  a  matter  of  managing  the  process  through  which  the  advice  is 
formulated. Moreover, as countries are not just a homogenous block, it is also a question 
of how the advice is targeted to the different audiences within a country.  
 
3. Costs and benefits of IMF and OECD surveillance 
As a lending institution, the IMF has particular clout in the case of program countries – 
and to some extent in emerging economies too. The OECD has to rely on the quality of 
ideas  and  the  relevance  of  comparative  policy  analysis.  There  has  been  considerable 45 
discussion over recent years concerning how the supervisory role of the Fund might be 
strengthened. The idea of liberating the IMF from direct pressure, in particular from the 
larger countries, was been put forward by Eichengreen et al (1999). It may indeed be hard 
to complain if some countries, by virtue of their having the  capacity  and the will to 
undertake  analyses  of  other  countries,  exert  more  influence  than  others.  One  way  of 
strengthening the Fund’s supervisory role would be to separate the analytical function 
from  lending  operations.  It  is  also  possible  to  separate  high  quality  analysis  and 
surveillance and then have the information made available for peer pressure exerted at the 
regional level, as such pressure is more naturally organized among smaller groups than in 
the context of global institutions. As argued below, this complementarity also reflects the 
Monterrey consensus. 
 
In addition to identifying external vulnerabilities and supporting international policy co-
ordination,  surveillance  as  practiced  by  the  IMF  may  serve  as  advice,  information 
gathering and dissemination to the public and to policy makers; technical assistance. The 
core  of  the  policy  advice  that  has  been  developed  over  the  years  though  is  simply 
“delivering the message” (Boughton 2001).  
 
In  that  sense,  there  is  a  complementarity  between  the  national  discussion  which  is 
enriched by the international analysis and the feedback from the particular circumstances 
of  national  discussion  which  enrich  international  analysis.  In  the  course  of  preparing 
country reviews, for example, the interactions with national officials, and their assistance 
in tailoring the analysis and recommendations to reflect their particular circumstances, 
are extremely useful. The output of the peer review process is not just the final report. It 
also includes the interactions in the course of its preparation between national officials, 
the  Secretariat  and  the  Committee.  The  meaningful  standard  of  the  effectiveness  of 
advice, surveillance and peer pressure is then the extent to which it positively influences 
the domestic debate. Sometimes this can be done through putting forward ideas that have 
yet  to  be  aired  in  domestic  debate;  on  other  occasions  it  can  be  by  assisting  in  the 
penetration of ideas that have been developed by national research institutes or think 
tanks.  
 
The scope of IMF surveillance has expanded greatly since that term was introduced with 
the revision the Fund’s articles of agreement in the mid-1970s. At that time it was a 
matter of “firm” surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members in the post 
Bretton Woods system of floating rates. The focus was on domestic policies in so far as 
these influenced the economy’s external position. Since then there has been a gradual 
shift towards advice on the best use of a wide range of policy instruments, whether or not 
they  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  country’s  external  account  or  exchange  rate.  This 
evolution  towards  “the  promotion  and  safeguarding  of  an  international  code  of  good 
conduct in national economic policy” (Guitian 1992) accompanied closer monitoring of 
national economies by market analysts and rating agencies. 
 
The country coverage widened substantially in the 1990s. Some have called it, without 
intending any criticism, “mission creep” into additional topics, in particular structural 
policies.  The following six themes now have a prominent part in the Fund’s review 46 
process (except in the least developed countries): labor market policies; product market 
reform;  privatization;  financial  sector  regulation  and  supervision;  trade  policy 
(notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  WTO  undertakes  reviews  in  this  area);  and,  the 
environment. The extension of this agenda comes from:  
1.  political pressure in member countries (for example in the US Congress which has 
urged greater liberalization);  
2.  the  addition  of  new  members  (for  example,  the  membership  of  the  transition 
economies  of  the  former  Soviet  Bloc  has  led  to  the  inclusion  of  new  topics  on 
structural reform);  
3.  the  experience  of  financial  crises;  the  need  for  additional  longer-term  lending 
facilities (it has been argued that an examination of structural policies is necessary for 
preparing programs);  
4.  the IMF "mission creep" in the structural policy area can also be explained by the 
shift in the analytical focus in economics over the last 15-20 years to medium-term 
supply-side issues.  
 
Member countries have being going through quite a dramatic paradigm shift which has 
altered their attitude towards structural policies and the IMF has only accorded a full-
scale investment of resources to those structural policy areas which it considers to be 
important  for  financial  and  macroeconomic  stability.  Examples  of  this  work  include 
financial sector stability assessments, technical assistance for central banking policy and 
work on tax policy (this latter particularly in developing countries in which IMF is co-
operating closely with OECD in an attempt to establish which are the best practices); in 
many other areas, such as privatization and labor market policies, IMF work has been less 
systematic than that of OECD with the focus in particular countries largely dictated by 
the assessment made by country teams.  
 
When the IMF concludes a consultation process, a Public Information Notice is issued by 
the Board. Until the end of the 1990s, the concluding statements were not published. 
Their  publication  may  have  led  to  a  watering  down  of  their  content  (though  this  is 
difficult  to  ascertain),  but  staff  do  retain  considerable  influence,  notably  through  the 
publication of a concluding statement at the end of their missions, the content of which 
tends to carry through to the Public Information Notice.  
 
The role of Executive Board is circumscribed by the weight of the overall agenda and the 
number of Article IV reports to consider: approximately 130 country reports, with 1½-2 
hours  devoted  to  each  (the  Economic  Development  Review  Committee,  EDRC  by 
contrast spends a full day even on small countries). Though they do have accumulated 
experience to bring to bear, the Executive Directors lack the resources to deal adequately 
with these reports. They depend heavily on comments from capitals which tend to be read 
out to the letter. As a consequence, there is little give and take in discussions. That said, 
the countries under examination tend not to exert much pressure to modify the report’s 
conclusions – the only reason that is readily accepted for such a modification is where 
“market  sensitive  information”  is  involved  which  could  be  harmful  to  the  country  in 
question. At OECD, by contrast, changes made tend to involve the removal of politically 
sensitive advice rather than market sensitive information.  47 
 
The  group  of  independent  experts  on  IMF  surveillance  (IMF  1999)  noted  a  direct 
negative correlation between the size of the country considered and the impact of the 
advice. A justification for this could lie in the fact that the larger the country the more 
civil servants, independent research institutes, banks and so forth there are engaged in 
examining and analyzing the country and so there is less scope for the IMF or indeed any 
other international institution to say anything new. Examples of direct positive impact are 
hard to find, even in small countries. The impact is easier to ascertain when a new regime 
has been introduced following IMF advice, for example, the Czech Republic’s exchange 
rate policy in the early 1990s, and the introduction by Sweden of an inflation target in 
1992-93. On the other side, it is clear that countries approaching crises have not been 
inclined to listen to advice. In the cases of: Brazil in January 1999, Czech Republic in 
1996-97, Korea in 1997, Thailand in 1996-97, the Fund did offer advice (and attempted 
to apply pressure) to modify unsustainable policies but this went unheeded. 
 
A further complication in evaluating the success of the IMF’s surveillance is the absence 
in most cases of relevant policy makers from the examined country when the report is 
being discussed by the Executive Board. To some extent, this has been responded to by 
increased transparency which has increased greatly with the publication of the Public 
Information Notices and the Article IV reports. There exists in this connection a trade-off 
between  confidentiality  and  transparency:  governments,  with  good  reason,  object  to 
public  discussion  of  vulnerabilities.  Based  on  the  argument  that  the  IMF  employs 
analysts who have the confidence of member countries, the whole process implies “peer 
pressure by proxy”. 
 
That there are areas of overlap and complementarity with the work of OECD should not 
be taken as a criticism with the way IMF has extended its mandate. The decisive principle 
governing whether or not this extension is justified is whether a particular element of 
structural  policy  is  relevant  to  overall  economic  performance  over  the  time  horizon 
analysed in the report. As stated in IMF (1999), its senior officials show a very positive 
attitude  towards  collaboration  with  other  organisations.  In  a  recent  statement,  the 
Executive  Board  had  requested  that  the  staff  make  more  use  of  the  work  of  other 
institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD. More could be done to that effect 
given the insufficient awareness within the IMF of the work on structural themes being 
planned  for  discussion  at  the  OECD.  As  good  bilateral  surveillance  is  an  essential 
underpinning for good macroeconomic surveillance, closer co-operation between the IMF 
and the OECD is both welcome and feasible.  
 
Peer pressure on the basis of commitments (as practised by the EU) or peer pressure by 
proxy  (as  practised  by  the  IMF)  are  mechanisms  that  illustrate  two  extremes  of 
multilateral  surveillance  of  national  economies.  The  OECD  peer  review  process  has 
elements of both but it is closer to that of the EU. It is carried out through 68 different 
monitoring and surveillance activities by 12 directorates (as listed in annex A of OECD 
2002) and is therefore extremely diverse and specialised - even though EDRC country 
reviews could not initially apply to the Euro zone as a whole! In any event, Thygesen 
(2002) list six distinct advantages of OECD surveillance over that of IMF:  48 
1.  there is more interaction with relevant national policy officials on the basis of the 
Secretariat’s draft reports;  
2.  the  involvement  in  discussing  and  modifying  reports  is  greater  than  that  of  the 
Executive Board;  
3.  the useful element of having two examining countries (which is the closest thing to 
pure peer pressure that exists in the international system);  
4.  the subsequent process of revising and approving report, which gives some ownership 
by the country to the final report (though this redrafting does consume a lot of time);  
5.  the Organisation’s manageable size (IMF 133, OECD 30) and limited diversity of 
membership (which is particularly beneficial in that it is difficult to keep up to date in 
technical areas);  
6.  the  continuity  (which  is  typically  around  3  years)  and  experience  of  the  national 
officials that countries send as representatives (and examiners). 
 
In considering the issue of countries approaching crisis and their receptiveness to advice, 
one should also consider whether international institutions have given the correct advice. 
Taking the case of Thailand, according to Blustein (2001), the IMF had clearly indicated 
that there were problems. Though it was perhaps less successful in spotting the problems 
in Korea (the OECD had flagged up its concerns), once the Korean crisis had started the 
Fund’s analysis evolved and it put forward policies which have helped the country to get 
out  of  its  problems  in  a  remarkably  short  period  of  time.  OECD  has  occasionally 
experienced the situation of undertaking an examination of a country at the same time as 
there has been an IMF programme in place. Thinking back to the review of Turkey at the 
end of 2000, it was clear that EDRC itself would not want the Survey to undermine an 
ongoing programme or programme negotiations, while recognising that the underlying 
analysis  should  point  out  areas  of  policy  where  reform  is  needed.  Turning  to  non-
programme  countries,  the  particular  contribution  of  the  OECD  resides  in  its 
comprehensive analytical coverage, ranging across both macroeconomic and structural 
policies. The Secretariat has placed increased emphasis on what it judges to be the key 
areas of structural reform that countries should focus on, rather than trying to give a 
comprehensive treatment of all issues.  
 
The success of a review exercise is partly dependent on how the officials representing the 
examined country before EDRC choose to react to the report. On those occasions that 
officials have been defensive and elected to hold the line on all the existing policies the 
atmosphere has become rather confrontational; it is probably the case that the most useful 
report does not emerge under such circumstances. It is when officials acknowledge that 
the draft report contains politically difficult (in the short term) but ultimately helpful 
economic advice that the most useful final reports emerge. It would appear indeed that 
the countries that get the most out of the review process are those that try to toughen up 
the reports’ recommendations in order to use it as an element of persuasion for improving 
long-term economic performance, which is the point of the exercise. 49 
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Figure 1 The Fed (left scale) and the housing bubble (right) 
 
 
Source: Gjerstadt & Smith (2009) 
 
Figure 2 Tracking the decline in US GDP & consumption 
 
 
Source: Chinn  http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2009/09/tracking_the_co.html 57 
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Effect of Lisbon Treaty
Effect of market turmoil
 
Source: Adapted from CEPR (1996) 
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Table 2 Regional Finance to Trade Ratios 
   EA   EA   EU  EU  NA  NA 
   1996  2006  1996  2006  1996  2006 
Finance* to Trade** 
Ratio 
3  3  6  7  8  9 
[*] Intra-regional foreign asset holdings and liabilities excluded; data available only until 
2004; [**] Intra-regional trade excluded;  
Source: Cohen-Setton and Pisani-Ferry (2008) 
 
YES  NO  NO  NO  Land 
NO  YES  YES  NO  Trade 
NO  NO  YES  YES  Finance 
NO  NO  NO  YES  Defense 
ROW  EAST 
ASIA 
EU  US (NA) 
YES  NO  NO  NO  Land 
NO  YES  YES  NO  Trade 
NO  NO  YES  YES  Finance 
NO  NO  NO  YES  Defense 
ROW  EAST 
ASIA 
EU  US (NA) 61 
Table 3 Bankrupcies since independence  
   1300-812  1813-90  1891-008  Total 
Spain  7  7  0  14 
France  9  0  0  9 
Brazil  -  0  8  8 
Germany 
3  3  2  8 
Austria  4  1  2  7 
Portugal   1  6  0  7 
Greece  -  3  2  5 
UK  2  0  0  2 
Netherlands  0  1  0  1 
Source:  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009,  tables  6.1-2-4-6,  pp.  86-99)  updating  Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) 
 


















Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, table 10.2, p. 149 and table 17.2, p. 285) 
Yrs Def Yrs Bkng Rating ∆ Rating
Portugal  11 2 85 33
Spain 24 8 90 19
Greece 51 4 81 19
Austria 17 2 95 9
Netherl 6 2 95 5
Brazil 25 9 61 4
UK 0 9 94 3
France 0 12 94 3
Germany 13 6 95 -4